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Abstract
In 1990, the Americans with Disability Act (ADA) was enacted to support disabled
Americans as they sought to procure equality in society and the workplace. Despite these
intentions, full implementation of the ADA has been fraught with court challenges and
legislative amendments. As it currently stands, it is unclear as to how the judicial system
is collectively interpreting a qualified disability. Using Clark and Connolly’s
interpretation of legal textualism as the theoretical foundation, the purpose of this case
study of the Americans with Disabilities Act was to better understand and explore how
the judiciary is currently interpreting qualified disability post-ADA amendments. Data
for this study included court interpretations and post-ADA amendment cases among the
12 United States Circuit Courts. These data were coded through a multi-stage coding
procedure that included evaluating coding, cycle coding, hand coding, and subcoding.
Coded data were analyzed using a thematic analysis procedure. The key theme emerging
from this study indicated that the ADA amendments still do not promote congressional
intent in the judiciary. This study has implications for positive social change by
informing Congress, legal practitioners, legal scholars, social scientists, and the disability
community on the ways in which the judiciary is interpreting ADA amendments
collectively among the 12 federal circuit courts.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Background
In 1990, then-President George H. W. Bush signed a bill proposed by Congress
that protected disabled individuals from discriminatory actions in American society
(Valenti, 2014). The bill was titled as the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The
ADA was implemented into law on July 26, 1990 and was swiftly established as a
venerated part of legislative history (Valenti, 2014; Knapp, 2013). Congressional intent
of the Act regarding a qualified disability was deemed an individual with “a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual; a record of such an impairment; or being regarded as having such an
impairment” (42 U.S.C. § 12102 (1) (A) (B) (C)). The protective equality proposed in the
bill would help disabled individuals when obtaining or sustaining gainful employment, as
well as promoting equality in society from discriminatory actions (Valenti, 2014). The
ADA would grant disabled individuals the opportunity to seek redress within the
judiciary when discriminated against (Valenti, 2014).
The statutory language of Congress’ Act explicitly illustrated a number in their
Findings and Purposes, which stated: “some 43,000,000 Americans have one or more
physical or mental disabilities, and this number is increasing as the population as a whole
is growing older” (42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (1)). The Act went on to specify that
“individuals with disabilities are a discrete and insular minority who have been faced
with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment,
and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our society” (42 U.S.C. § 12101
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(a) (7)). Therefore, Congress’ main reason for the Act was to negate unequal treatment of
disabled individuals in society, and an estimated 43 million Americans would benefit
from the Act. However, this suggested number was not supposed to be the end all number
of disabled Americans that would potentially benefit from the Act. Hence, this number
was just a starting point, but later the courts would use this number as Congress’ exact
number to narrowly interpret a qualified disability and/or impairment. This narrow
interpretation of a qualified disability was a misinterpretation to congressional intent
(Valenti, 2014).
Congress further asserted that disabled individuals must have “full participation,
independent living, and economic self-sufficiency” (42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (8)). Congress
noted as well, within the ADA, that not granting disabled individuals these salient rights
would ultimately cost the American government billions of dollars, because disabled
individuals were unnecessarily dependent upon the government (42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a)
(9)). Congress defined a disability as stated above as “a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; a
record of such an impairment; or being regarded as having such an impairment” (42
U.S.C. § 12102 (1) (A) (B) (C)). This definition was not transformed after ADA
amendments were attached, only expounded upon regarding a qualified disability. The
reason why the amendments were implemented to the ADA was because the courts
consistently misinterpreted congressional intent.
Valenti (2014) and Befort (2013) pointed out that Congress’ newly clarified ADA
amendments would likely be misinterpreted again in the courts. Despite Congress’
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clarifying amendments, as to what qualifies as a disability or impairment that is
substantially limiting remain because the primary definition did not change. This was
evident in a recent 2015 Colorado District Court case, Ortega v. South Colorado Clinic,
P. C., (U.S. Dist, 2015), which the court used pre-ADA amendment reasoning, even
though clarifying ADA amendments were in effect. Thus, allowing the case to be
dismissed or summary disposition, against the plaintiff’s employment discrimination suit.
This case and others, as well as the literature, will be addressed in Chapter 2.
According to Befort (2013), within 4 years after the implementation of the ADA,
litigation in relation to employment discrimination cases increased by 128% in the federal
judiciary. From 1992 through 1998, disability discrimination charges increased in the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) with more than 108,000 claims
(Befort, 2013). The reason why litigation increased at a high rate after ADA’s inception,
was due to previously unavailable judiciary redress under the ADA (Martin, Martin, &
Terman, 1996). The courts, in the case of Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transp., (W.D. Ark. 1994)
stated that ADA interpretation, as it arises in the federal judiciary, had all the earmarks of
becoming an outlandish litigation producer, severely doubting whether Congress truly
intended such litigation to result. Thus, because of the amount of litigation developing in
the judiciary, as well as the number of EEOC discriminatory complaints, induced the
judiciary to interpret congressional intent in relation to a qualified disability (Befort,
2013). As previously noted, Congress did specify that the ADA would be consequential
to 43 million Americans (42 U.S.C. §12101 (a) (1)). This precise number quoted in the
statute was the primary reason why the judiciary felt it had to interpret what a qualified
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disability was, because the language regarding the exact number was deemed ambiguous
as to how many individuals could seek haven under the Act (Toyota Motor
Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 2002; Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transp., 1994).
Addressing when the judiciary should interpret congressional intent or leave it
unaccompanied is often confusing. Powell (1985) suggested that establishing original
intent is often advised by most legal scholars to not contradict the primary intent of the
framers and/or Congress. In Commissioner v. Engle (1984), it was asserted that the “sole
task of the Court in statutory interpretation is to determine congressional intent" (p. 214).
Whereas, Staples v. United States (1994) suggested that statutory analysis should begin
with the plain language of the statute at hand. And Ardestani v. INS, (1991), as cited in
American Public Power Association v. NRC, (D.C. Cir. 1993) emphasized "the plain
language of [a] statute expresses congressional intent." Lastly, it is customary for the
courts to assume that the legislative body when establishing statutory legislation that the
statute means what it says (Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 1992; U.S. v. Bost, (D.C.
Cir. 1996).
However, McNollgast (1994) wrote there are three contemporary theories in
relation to statutory interpretation. First, is that pragmatically “words mean precisely
what the person in authority [Congress] says they mean" (McNollgast, 1994, p. 4).
Second, and often referenced as textualism, is “that common law and private
arrangements have greater claims to legitimacy then statutory law” (McNollgast, 1994, p.
4). Thus, textualism in relation to a statute is often narrowly interpreted, because if the
statute is unclear concerning the language in the statute, the statute should not be
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explicitly adhered to (McNollgast, 1994). Last, McNollgast (1994) posited that when
statutory interpretation is necessary or compulsory, adhering to the following five steps
would invoke comprehensive statutory intent for a statute that is implicit.
McNollgast (1994) asserted that the Step 1 is to simply “read the text" (p. 5). Step
2 is to try and understand the primary purpose of the statute when it was written or
promulgated, as well as looking at other statutes that could offer clarification
(McNollgast, 1994). Step 3, and pragmatically, is to look at the legislative history in
relation to whether the elected officials explained the ambiguities that might be
problematic within the statute. Step 4, taking all previous steps together an individual
should “ascertain when statutory provisions in question reflect politically legitimate
values or the pathologies of representative democracy" (McNollgast, 1994, p. 5). If
ambiguities still exist in the statute, an individual should proceed to the final step. Step 5
“invoke(s) normative principles…to determine whether the statute should be applied, and
if so, how to resolve the ambiguities and compensate for the pathologies" (McNollgast,
1994, p. 5). McNollgast (1994) further noted that the preceding steps could assist judges
and other legal professionals when trying to establish congressional intent of a statute that
is ambiguous, or when the intent is not explicit in the statute.
The overall understanding in relation to congressional intent regarding judiciary
interpretation is whether the statute is ambiguous; and, if so, the judiciary has the abovenoted specific tools to interpret congressional intent, (i.e., congressional hearings, floor
debates, other statutes, as well as court rulings). Nevertheless, for this study,
congressional intent used McNollgast’s (1994) rule of thumb. And commencement of
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judiciary interpretation was understood to mean when the judiciary deemed a statute to be
ambiguous.
Now that an understanding has been offered concerning what congressional intent
is and when the judiciary needs to interpret a statute, a more thorough understanding as to
why ADA litigation flourished in the courts can be further explored. Fairclough,
Robinson, Nichols, and Cousley (2013) stated, as ADA litigation increased in the
judiciary, that two significant cases played a striking role in setting primary case
precedent relating to the meaning of a qualifying disability (Fairclough et al., 2013).
These Supreme Court cases were Sutton v. United Airlines (1999), and Toyota Motor
Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams (2002). Subsequently, it was Sutton v. United
Airlines (1999) that directly addressed what qualified as a physical or mental impairment
concerning disability.
The court established in Sutton that if the impairment “could be ameliorated
through mitigating measures” (Sutton v. United Airlines, 1999, as cited in Fairclough et
al., 2013, p. 279), and if it did not “substantially limit one or more major life activities…
it could not be a disability protected under the Act" (Sutton v. United Airlines, 1999;
Fairclough et al., 2013, p. 279). Specifically, the court reasoned that if medication
controlled or corrected an impairment, then an individual was no longer impaired,
because the disabled individual could now perform daily activities that did not impact
their daily lives in a major way (Sutton v. United Airlines, 1999, pp. 499 – 500). This
reasoning by the Supreme Court was once again echoed in Toyota Motor Manufacturing,
Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams (2002).
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Moreover, Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams (2002)
established a pertinent definition that “‘major life activities’ means important…. [and]
refers to those activities that are central to daily life" (p. 197). The Court further
explained that if Congress truly intended that all impairments constitute a disability,
Congress would have surely recognized or proposed a greater number than that of 43
million as those to be aided by the Act (Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v.
Williams, 2002). Per Waterstone (2015), Webber (2014), and Valenti (2014), these
Supreme Court cases were the catalyst for implementation of the ADA amendments in
2008, formally promulgated into law in 2009. Webber (2014) stated these Supreme Court
decisions inherently misinterpreted congressional intent by significantly mounting a
narrow definition of a qualified disability. Congress asserted, in 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (5)
-(8), that the Supreme Court established narrow and inept definitions relating to
substantial limits vis-à-vis major life activities when establishing a qualified disability.
Thus, Congress implemented amendments to the ADA, correcting and negating Supreme
Court holdings that misinterpreted Congress’ actual intent as to the definition of a
qualified disability (Valenti, 2014). Hence, these new amendments would now establish
The Americans with Disability Act Amended Act (ADAAA).
There is a gap in the extant literature about judicial interpretation of these postADA amendments (see Chapter 2). Currently, there is consensus among scholars that the
ADAAA will be misinterpreted once again by the judicial system, as the amendments do
not inherently overcome challenges of the original ADA (Waterstone, 2015; Webber,
2014; Valenti, 2014; Befort, 2013; Fairclough et al., 2013). This is not because the
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amendments are not clearer, or poorly drafted, but rather that there are sections in the
ADAAA that could be considered ambiguous due to those sections not having been
properly interpreted or tested (Weber, 2014; Cavaliere et al., 2012; Ara, 2010). As
previously mentioned, Ortega v. South Colorado Clinic, P. C., (U.S. Dist, 2015) used
pre-ADA court rulings during post-ADA amendments to dismiss a litigant’s case after a
motion for summary disposition. This topic will be expanded on in Chapter 2. Valenti
(2014), Webber (2014), and the National Council on Disability (NCD, 2013), an
independent federal agency, all suggested in tandem that the ADA amendments need
further social scientific research to understand how the judiciary is applying the
amendments, collectively, concerning a qualified disability under the new ADAAA.
Introduction to the ADA and Amendments
The pragmatics of the ADA and subsequent ADA amendments were to repudiate
continuous discriminatory actions placed onto individuals with disabilities in and out of
the workplace (42 U.S.C § 12101note: (a) (1), as cited by Valenti, 2014). It was the 101st
Congress that implemented the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, signed into law
on July 26, 1990 (Knapp, 2013). After implementation, it was recognized as a pertinent
Act having full legal cogency from discriminating against individuals with disabilities
(Williams, Devaux, Fuschetti, & Salomon, 2013). What came next for the ADA is that it
was quickly interpreted by the judiciary incorrectly vis-à-vis a qualified disability
concerning congressional intent (42 U.S.C. note: §12101 (a)(3); as cited by Webber,
2014). Congress expected “that the definition of disability under the original Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, would be interpreted consistently with how courts had
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applied the definition of a handicapped individual under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
[Congress noted] that expectation has not been fulfilled” (42 U.S.C. note: §12101 (a)(3)).
Furthermore, the judiciary interpretation of a qualified disability established a narrow
definition (42 U.S.C. note: §12101 (a) (4) -(8)) that did not allow permissible protection
for disabled individuals as Congress initially intended (42 U.S.C. note: §12101 (a)(3);
Valenti, 2014).
Congress, being dissatisfied, was forced to amend the ADA due to Supreme Court
decisions that narrowly interpreted a qualified disability (Webber, 2014; Valenti, 2014).
Congress’ new primary purpose was to establish a “broader scope of protection” for
disabled individuals under the ADA amendments (42 U.S.C. note: §12101 (b) (1)).
Congress also wished to negate past court rulings of the Supreme Court holdings
established in Sutton v. United Air Lines (1999), and Toyota Motor Manufacturing,
Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams (2002) that erroneously applied congressional intent in relation
to a qualified disability (42 U.S.C. note: §12101 (b) (2) -(5)). The court rulings of the
noted cases will be further addressed in the literature review. Therefore, then-President
George W. Bush, and the 110th Congress, amended the ADA of 1990, in 2008, becoming
law in 2009, to negate Supreme Court decisions and lower court rulings that
misinterpreted congressional intent as to a qualified disability, as well as other
subsections in the Act (42 U.S.C. §12101 et seq; as cited by Webber, 2014).
Webber (2014) suggested that the implementation of the Americans with
Disability Act Amended Act (ADAAA) inherently did not change the definition under
the previous ADA, as it only implemented "‘instructional amendments’ which direct the
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courts to reject the prior precedent and to interpret the same statutory language in a
different way" (Webber, 2014, p. 307). Williams et al. (2013) put forward that the
judiciary had incorrectly interpreted major life activities, and substantially limits in
relation to a qualified disability, when the judiciary assumed that major life activities
need to be "of central importance to most people's daily lives…. [And] [e]pisodic or
intermittent conditions were not… impairments because they did not consistently
interfere with major life activities" (pp. 109 – 110). Thus, the judiciary cases held that the
phrase, substantially limits fundamentally should be interpreted as pertinent conditions
that "‘prevent or severely restrict’ accomplishment of a major life activity" (Toyota
Motor Manufacture, v. Williams, 2002, p. 198; as cited in Williams et al., 2013, p. 110).
Hence, Congress, in implementing the ADAAA, clarified that the judiciary
interpretations were not Congress’ intent, and that the narrowing judiciary interpretations
excluded disabled individuals from obtaining equality in society (42 U.S.C. 12101,
2008).
Congress noted that a qualified disability should have a lower threshold when the
courts interpret the new ADA as amended regarding a qualified disability (Weber, 2014).
Crosgrove, Fink, Dillion, and Wedding (2015) pointed out that the amended ADA for
employment practices prohibited discriminatory actions against disabled individuals. As a
result, the ADAAA fundamentally provided a more precise and comprehensive guide as
to how a qualified disability should be interpreted, (i.e., not restrictively narrowing
Valenti, 2014). This was obvious during the 2008 ADA amendments Senate floor
discussion. Senator Orrin Hatch pointed out to Congress that the above-noted Supreme
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Court decisions “had the effect of narrowing the ADA's coverage and the protection it
affords…. these decisions ignored what Congress intended in the Americans with
Disabilities Act. Others explained them by saying the Court had to reconcile everything
Congress said in the ADA” (ADA Amendments Act; Floor Speech, para. 7, September
11, 2008). Senator Hatch further pointed out that, “when it comes to legislation, when
Congress does not like something, Congress can change it, and that is what we are doing
today” (ADA Amendments Act; Floor Speech, para. 8, September 11, 2008). Senator
Hatch’s floor speech is extremely important because this speech established and alerted
Congress the necessity for the ADA amendments.
Moreover, Senator Hatch stated to Congress that the original Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, which 43 million Americans could benefit from, was the
catalyst for the judiciary to place a pertinent cap as to how many million Americans
could seek haven under the Act, and was an incorrect presumption by the judiciary (ADA
Amendments Act; Floor Speech, September 11, 2008). Senator Hatch further articulated
that the bill would lower the threshold when an impairment constitutes a disability (ADA
Amendments Act; Floor Speech, September 11, 2008). Lastly, the new bill, or ADA
amendments, from that point forward, would define a qualified disability more broadly
(ADA Amendments Act; Floor Speech, September 11, 2008). Thus, Congress understood
by and through these floor debates that a problem existed with the original ADA,
ultimately leading to the amendments. Hence, Senator Hatch’s floor speech plea was
subsequently adhered to in the formal ADA amendments.
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Webber (2014) stated that the judiciary would adhere to prior ADA
misinterpretations of a qualified disability because of the Supreme Court’s history of
narrowly defining discriminatory statutes against public policy stakeholders—the primary
reason why the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 was misinterpreted in the first
place. Accordingly, scholars further stated that the ADAAA needed examination
continually to ensure that the judiciary does, in fact, adhere to congressional intent
(Valenti, 2014; Webber, 2014; National Council on Disability, 2013; Cavaliere,
Mulvaney, & Swerdlow, 2012). Therefore, the ADAAA is important primarily due to its
pragmatic ability to institute equality for disabled individuals in society at large, as well
as negating discriminatory insolence through judicial redress.
Statement of the Problem
There is a problem in the judiciary concerning the Americans with Disability Act
Amended Act (ADAAA), and how the judicial system is collectively interpreting a
qualified disability (Weber, 2014; Cavaliere et al., 2012; Ara, 2010). The literature
review in Chapter 2 has suggested that the amendments do not inherently prevent the
judiciary from misinterpreting the ADAAA, because the amendments require only that a
qualified disability be interpreted broadly (Weber, 2014; Cavaliere et al., 2012; Ara,
2010). This still allows the judiciary to interpret how broad a qualified disability should
be, even after congressional clarification (Weber, 2014; Cavaliere et al., 2012; Ara,
2010). Moreover, what disabilities and/or impairments will fall under the new ADAAA
in the judiciary are still being determined (Weber, 2014; Cavaliere et al., 2012; Ara,
2010). There is now sufficient empirical evidence to research how the judiciary
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collectively is interpreting qualified disability post-ADA amendments. This problem
impacts the disabled community relating to procurement of equality in society and in the
workplace, (i.e., if the judiciary is not adhering to congressional intent). There are various
possible contributors to this problem, but this study sought to ascertain whether the ADA
amendments were being adhered to in the judiciary as Congress intended, and, if so, what
disabilities and/or impairments were being deemed to have coverage under the ADAAA.
This non-collegial question has prompted scholarly debate that the ADA amendments do
not rectify the problem in the judicial system to misinterpret congressional intent once
again (Weber, 2014; Cavaliere et al., 2012; Ara, 2010). This is because the broadening
definition of a qualified disability may perhaps be established by the judiciary to be
ambiguous and interpret again (Weber, 2014; Cavaliere et al., 2012; Ara, 2010). Lastly,
Weber (2014), Cavaliere et al. (2012), and Ara (2010) further suggested there are other
ways that the ADAAA can be found problematic by the judiciary, and allowing them to
interpret.
The National Council on Disability (NCD, 2013) reported to the President that
how a qualified disability, and other parts of the ADA amendments, were being
interpreted in the judicial system, is currently not fully understood at present. However,
the NCD did see signs in their research that suggested advantageous and disadvantageous
rulings among the district and circuit courts. Nevertheless, the NCD (2013) report
strongly suggested to the President that subsequent research was needed, as more
empirical evidence would likely become available. Now, more than 3 years after the
NCD (2013) report was published, there is new empirical evidence that can be further
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analyzed in judicial rulings. Thus, there are now supplementary adjudicated judiciary
opinions in the courts for empirical study and review.
Webber (2014) emphasized that the judicial system has a long history of
undermining congressional intent when it comes to discriminatory statutes, and that the
judiciary will interpret a qualified disability again in a restrictive manner against
congressional intent because of this history. Webber's thought process is not implausible,
or a fanciful conceptualization, primarily because Congress was reasonably explicit as to
the ADA's intent for integrating disabled individuals into mainstream American life.
Pragmatically, legislative amendments, in and of themselves, fundamentally establish
pre-existing complications with a congressional statute (Valenti, 2014). To that end, the
current impediment is simply whether the ADA amendments overcome past challenges
of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.
Nonetheless, two subsequent cases can be used as predictors to assert the issue of
judiciary misinterpretation of the ADAAA. (Note, these cases will be fully articulated in
Chapter 2.) Ortega v. South Colorado Clinic, P. C., (U.S. Dist., 2015), used pre-ADA
reasoning or court rulings during post-ADA amendments. And Smothers v. Solway
Chemicals Inc. (10th Cir., 2014), established a specific number of doctor visits to
determine a sleep disorder, which would be used in Ortega v. South Colorado Clinic, P.
C., (U.S. Dist., 2015), as a primary precedent to disallow ADAAA coverage for the
plaintiff’s alleged sleep disorder. Therefore, this endeavor is worth understanding
scientifically, primarily because of the impact the ADA amendments would have on the
disabled community if the amendments are being misconstrued again. Thus, this would

15
allow judiciary standards to once more implement a narrowing interpretation relating to
qualified disabilities and impairments under the new the ADAAA.
Purpose of the Study
The primary purpose of this qualitative case study was to understand and explore
how the judiciary is currently interpreting the ADAAA regarding a qualified disability, as
well as what disabilities and/or impairments are presently covered under the ADA
amendments. This case study will also explore whether judiciary interpretation is
adhering to congressional intent. Webber (2014), Valenti (2014), and Cavaliere et al.
(2012) asserted that the likelihood of the judiciary misinterpreting congressional intent
once again is a continuing belief. Congress’ purpose for the ADA and subsequent
amendments was to integrate disabled individuals into mainstream America without
discriminatory engagement (Valenti, 2014).
Thus, the primary purpose of this study was to understand how the judicial system
is interpreting post-ADA amendments in relation to a qualified disability, and to
understand how this main purpose will provide explicit insight as to how Congress’ intent
for disabled individuals is currently working in the judicial system, (i.e., either with or
against congressional intent). And, the secondary purpose is what disabilities and/or
impairments are being considered a qualified disability that perhaps were not before
ADA amendments. The scholarly consensus, as noted above, suggested that the ADA
amendments still allow judicial interpretation, since the judicial system can still find
ambiguities in the law, even with Congress’ explicit clarification of the Act.
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Nature of the Study
The primary landscape of this study for the methodology was qualitative in
nature, and the interior research design was case study. Furthermore, qualitative and case
study are indicative types of analysis when trying to ascertain how and why a
phenomenon happened (O'Sullivan, Rassel, & Berner, 2008). Pragmatically, this has been
the primary intent of this study, (i.e., to understand not only how the judiciary is
interpreting a qualified disability after ADA amendments, but if their interpretations are
adhering to congressional intent). Understanding this primary intent has also sought to
ascertain how and why the judiciary determined that the first Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 was ambiguous in nature, consequently, misinterpreting congressional intent.
Therefore, this understanding has assisted in addressing the literary gap of whether the
new ADAAA is being applied per congressional intent.
Regarding research questions, Creswell (2013) asserts qualitative studies should
dominantly be open-ended, promoting probative inquiry; this pertinent study used
Creswell’s thought process. Utilizing open-ended questions promoted evidentiary
investigation which did not allow me, as the researcher, to be skewed by leading or
subjective questions. Therefore, purposeful sampling was employed when obtaining
archival data or adjudicated ADAAA court cases in ADAAA jurisprudence. This
sampling strategy’s primary goal was “to focus on particular characteristics of a
population that is of interest, which will best enable to answer research questions”
(Laerd, 2012, para. 4). Wherefore, the population of interest for this dissertation has been
all 12 federal circuit courts.
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Data Sources
The United States Court of Appeals, commonly known as the circuit courts, was
the primary data sources used when procuring archival data or adjudicated ADAAA
cases. Thus, all 12 circuit courts were analyzed. The circuit courts commonly review
cases derived from the federal district court rulings, and pragmatically are decided upon
appeal from a proper litigant, as to whether the lower court ruling was proper or
improper, applying various standards of review when doing so (Federal Courts of Appeal,
2016). The primary reason why the United States Court of Appeals or Circuit Courts
were selected as the primary data source was to compare and contrast all ADAAA
decisions.
Hence, this study provides an understanding as to how the circuit courts are
collectively interpreting a qualified disability after ADA amendments, as well as what
disabilities and impairments are also being considered a qualified disability in the current
judiciary. It should be mentioned that the reason why the Supreme Court was not selected
as a primary data source is that there are no current Supreme Court rulings regarding a
qualified disability after ADA amendments. According to Yin (2003), six possible
sources of evidence exist for case studies, which are “documents, archival records,
interviews, direct observation, participant-observation, and physical artifacts” (pp. 83, 8596). Therefore, documents and archival records were used as the primary data sources.
This level of documents and archival records as a primary expertise will be
established further in Chapter 3. Furthermore, it is posited by me, as the researcher, that
by procuring all documents, and/or archival records, I established reasonable coverage
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for the phenomenon while achieving saturation or redundancy. By acquiring all archival
records or adjudicated cases among the 12 federal circuits regarding post-ADA
amendment cases I have established saturation, thus, encompassing all information
available. Patton (2002) asserted that redundancy is established when no new information
can be ascertained. However, I have been mindful of Patton’s thinking that often an
appropriate sample size should be flexible and emergent in nature.
Based upon the National Council on Disability (2013), which presented a similar
report as this dissertation to the President of the United States in 2013, only 23 cases
were presented as to how the current ADAAA fared in the federal district and circuit
courts. Only seven cases were found for review in the federal circuit courts. For this
study, I used LexisNexis legal database to ascertain how many ADAAA cases could be
found currently in the noted database, and it was estimated that over 80 circuit court cases
were found mentioning the ADAAA, and over 800 district court cases after 2009. The
primary query used for the ADAAA cases was entering Boolean phrases that addressed a
qualified disability, and the ADAAA. Thus, LexisNexis legal database was used to
procure a purposeful criterion sample of ADAAA adjudicated cases from 2009 through
2017, hence, only selecting those cases that addressed judicial decisions of a qualified
disability and/or impairment.
Subsequently, it should be noted that some of the same cases, as presented by the
NCD (2013), are inserted in this study because the date span of 2009 through 2017 is
only three years after NCD’s (2013) report to the President. Last, I made use of Patton’s
Criterion Sampling, as I selected only those cases meeting a pertinent criterion (2002).
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And, the relevant criterion sampling for this dissertation was to reveal how the judiciary
has interpreted qualified disability post-ADA amendments, as well as what disabilities
and impairments are now being encompassed as a qualified disability in the judiciary.
Qualitative Research Questions
The research questions and subquestions used in this qualitative case study are as
follows:
1. How has congressional expansion and clarification of a qualified disability
impacted judicial interpretation of a qualified disability post-ADA
amendments?
2. What are the major changes between judicial decisions regarding a qualified
disability during the first ADA and now the new ADA amendments?
A. What types of disabilities and impairments are or are not being
considered a qualified disability in the judicial system?
B. What disabilities and impairments have been added as a qualified
disability since ADA amendments?
Theoretical Framework
This study used textualism as its theoretical framework. Clark and Connolly
(2006) suggested, “textualism focuses on the words and phrases of the statute and
deemphasizes the role of the reader (usually, the judge) in creating meaning" (p. 13).
Primarily, textualism focuses on the plain meaning of the statute and intrinsically does
not utilize legislative history as a main tool when interpreting the statute (Clark &
Connolly, 2006, p. 13). During the review of the literature there is a temperament
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amongst scholars that the courts will continue to use textualism as the dominant legal tool
when interpreting the ADAAA, and one of the reasons why the courts will not change
their disposition despite ADA amendments (Webber, 2014; Cavaliere et al., 2012).
Pragmatically, the reason why the courts will not change their prior analysis is because
they are still utilizing textualism, and not looking toward legislative intent. For example,
Justice Scalia endorsed the primary use of dictionaries to ascertain definitions when
deriving the plain meaning of words in a statute and not typically looking at the
legislative intent for the meaning (Clark & Connolly, 2006, p. 13).
The case as cited in the preceding paragraphs, known as Toyota Motor
Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams (2002) did just that; the court used a
dictionary when interpreting the plain meaning of the word major. Specifically, Toyota
Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams (2002), established that “‘major life
activities’ means important…. [and] refers to those activities that are of central to daily
life" (p. 197). This United States Supreme Court case was the dominant case that led to
the ADA amendments, because Congress specified that the noted case, as well as other
judiciary cases, did not adhere to congressional intent vis-à-vis a qualified disability. This
was expounded upon in the Act under 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (5)-(8), stating that the
Supreme Court established narrow and inept definitions for substantially limits vis-à-vis
major life activities when determining a qualified disability. This happened when the
court used a dictionary to interpret the word, major as meaning important. Congress
vehemently stated that this was not their legislative intent.
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Subsequently, Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams (2002),
arguably used textualism when interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
regarding its interpretation of a disability and impairments by fixating on the exact
number illuminated by Congress that, “if Congress truly intended all impairments as
establishing a disability that, Congress would surely have recognized or proposed a
greater number than that of 43 million, as those to be helped by the Act” (Toyota Motor
Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 2002). McGinnis (2009) also suggested in
tandem with Clark and Connolly (2006) that textualism, when understanding legislators’
intent of a statute, the practical meaning of the word of the statute should be given the
greatest weight.
However, McGinnis (2009) stated that if words are uncertain or dubious in nature
“that judges should look to the reason and spirit of the law…. if judges… believe it is
necessary to further a legislature’s intent" (p. 789). McNollgast (1994) pronounced that in
statutory interpretation often “words mean precisely what the person in authority
[Congress] says they mean" (p. 4). Hence, it is undeniable that the judiciary, as well as
the Supreme Court, used textualism by precisely looking at the plain meaning of the
statute, and the words in the statute or Act, to derive the statutory interpretation of a
qualified disability. Textualism as a theoretical framework can support the understanding
of why and how the judiciary and the United States Supreme Court hypothesized, and
derived at their interpretation of a qualified disability by only looking at the plain
meaning of the statute and words within, to discover statutory congressional intent.
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Furthermore, understanding if textualism will be used in the judiciary when
interpreting the plain meaning of the ADAAA is highly probable because the ADA
amendments do not change the primary definition of a qualified disability, only that it
should be interpreted broadly (Weber, 2014; Cavaliere et al., 2012; Ara, 2010). Hence,
the ADA amendments explicitly suggested that the judiciary needs to interpret the
ADAAA in a more “broader scope of protection” (42 U.S.C. note: §12101 (b) (1)) for
disabled individuals under the ADA amendments (42 U.S.C. note: §12101 (b) (1)).
Therefore, this congressional direction to the judiciary allows the judiciary to determine a
qualified disability again. That is, how broad a disability and/or impairment should be
interpreted; hence, establishing procedures that will identify disabilities and/or
impairments currently in the judiciary and in the future.
This was recently evident in the case known as, Ortega v. South Colorado Clinic,
P. C., (2015), in which the court specified a specific number of times an individual need
to establish a sleep disorder, relying upon the 2014 case known as Smothers v. Solway
Chemicals Inc., (10th Cir. 2014). Under the new ADA amendments, sleep disorders are
now included as a qualified disability. Nevertheless, as mentioned above in the Smothers
v. Solway Chemicals Inc., (10th Cir. 2014) case, the court specified a specific number,
that being 12 doctor visits, to establish a sleep disorder. Thus, the judiciary found it
necessary to interpret the ADA amendments regarding sleep disorders, when the
amendments clearly expressed that sleep disorders are now protected under the Act
without requiring a specific number of doctor visits. Thus, not looking at legislative
intent, as to what quantifies a sleep disorder, but interpreting by and through textualism.
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The Smothers v. Solway Chemicals Inc., (10th Cir. 2014) case would be used as a
catalyst to produce a sleep disorder under the ADA amendments, which would
subsequently be used in the Ortega v. South Colorado Clinic, P. C., (U.S. Dist, 2015)
case, to set a precedent to permit summary disposition against the plaintiff, since she
could not rise to the level created by Smothers judiciary standards. Furthermore, and
again, the courts interpreted congressional intent by and through textualism when the
court did not directly look at legislative history. Hence, the courts still are utilizing
textualism as they previously did to understand preconceived ambiguities post-ADA
amendments. Therefore, the theoretical framework for this dissertation will be textualism.
This theoretical framework, textualism, as well as the cases offered above will be fully
articulated and expounded upon in Chapter 2, literature review.
Definitions of Terms
Adjudicated: "1) In a judicial proceeding, the act of resolving a dispute or
deciding a case. 2) A judicial ruling or decision" (Cornell University Law School, 2016a,
para. 1).
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: “A federal law that prohibits
discrimination against people with physical or mental disabilities in employment, public
services, and places of public accommodation…. The law also requires employers to
make reasonable accommodations to allow employees with disabilities to do their jobs”
(Cornell University Law School, 2016b, para 1).
Attorney: "a class of persons admitted by the state's highest court or by a federal
court to practice law in that jurisdiction" (Gifis, 2003, p. 38).
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Court’s Holding: "in procedure, any ruling of the court, including rulings upon
the admissibility of evidence are other questions presented during trial, may be termed a
‘holding’" (Gifis, 2003, p. 236).
Court’s Opinion: "statement that is prepared by a judge or court announcing the
decision after a case is tried… and is usually presented in writing, though occasionally an
oral opinion is rendered" (Legal Dictionary, 2016, para 1).
Defendant: "the party responding to the complaint; ‘one who was sued and called
upon to make satisfaction for a wrong complained by another, [the plaintiff].’ In criminal
proceedings, also called the accused" (Gifis, 2003, p. 134).
Disabled Individual: "(1) ‘disability’ means, with respect to an individual—(A) a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities
of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having
such an impairment" (42 U.S.C. 12102 (1) (A) (B) (C), 2016).
Discriminatory or Discrimination: "the unequal treatment of parties who are
similarly situated" (Gifis, 2003, p. 150).
Federal Circuit and District Courts: "the courts of the United States, as
distinguished from the courts of the individual states…. Presently, the principal federal
courts are the district courts… The Court of Appeals (formerly circuit courts of appeals;
principally appellate review courts)" (Gifis, 2003, p. 199).
Judicial System: See judiciary below.
Judiciary: "department of government establish to interpret and administer the
law. The courts and all those connected with the practice of law" (Gifis, 2003, p. 278).
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Lawsuit or suit: "a very comprehensive [word] ,… understood to apply to any
proceeding in a court of justice by which an individual pursues [a] remedy which the law
affords" (Gifis, 2003, p. 502).
Litigant: "part[y] involved in a lawsuit" (Gifis, 2003, p. 301).
Post Hoc: "Lat: after this, therefore because of this; a maximum setting for the
false logic that because one event occurs after another event, it was caused by the prior
event" (Gifis, 2003, p. 385).
Prima Facie Case: "the case sufficient on its face, being supported by at least the
requisite minimum of evidence, and being free from palpable defects" (Gifis, 2003, p.
395).
Qualified Disability: A qualified individual with a disability is a person who
meets legitimate skill, experience, education, or other requirements of an employment
position that he or she holds or seeks, and who can perform the "essential functions" of
the position with or without reasonable accommodation. Requiring the ability to perform
"essential" functions assures that an individual will not be considered unqualified simply
because of inability to perform marginal or incidental job functions. If the individual is
qualified to perform essential job functions except for limitations caused by a disability,
the employer must consider whether the individual could perform these functions with a
reasonable accommodation. If a written job description has been prepared in advance of
advertising or interviewing applicants for a job, this will be considered as evidence,
although not necessarily conclusive evidence, of the essential functions of the job. (U.S.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 2016, para. 4).
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Statute: "an act of the legislature, adopted pursuant to its constitutional authority,
by prescribed means and in certain form such that it becomes the law governing conduct
within its scope" (Gifis, 2003, p. 492).
Summary Disposition: See summary judgment below.
Summary Judgment: "preverdict judgment rendered by the court in response to a
motion by plaintiff or defendant, who claims that the absence of factual dispute on one or
more issues eliminates the need to send those issues to the jury" (Gifis, 2003, p. 503).
Assumptions
1. It was assumed that I will be able to obtain access to documentation and
adjudicated cases by visiting congressional websites, legal databases, or
visiting libraries in search of research material.
2. It was assumed that my personal disability protected under the ADAAA will
not preclude my ability to present the findings in this study in a non-bias
manner; thus, promoting and adhering to all the elements of validity in a
qualitative scientific research study.
3. It was assumed that all documentation selected will reflect the current court
rulings and/or holdings of judicial interpretation of a qualified disability and
no documents will be dismissed to promote a skewed view of the current
facts.
Scope
The scope of this study was chosen due to the problematic history of
jurisprudence relating to judicial interpretation and congressional intent of a qualified
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disability. The current literature distinctly posited that judicial misinterpretation for the
ADAAA will continue, primarily because the ADA amendments do not pragmatically
cure the challenges regarding congressional intent (Webber, 2014; Cavaliere et al., 2012).
This is the dominant motive why this study regarding a qualified disability was chosen.
Moreover, the theoretical framework selected is textualism, which is dominantly used to
understand how and why a statute is deemed ambiguous and in need of judiciary
interpretation. Therefore, textualism will support an understanding of how and why
judicial interpretation led to the new ADAAA, its prior policy breakdown, as well as
continuing monitoring as suggested by the noted scholars (Valenti, 2014; Webber, 2014;
National Council on Disability, 2013; Cavaliere, Mulvaney, & Swerdlow, 2012).
The identified population in this qualitative multiple case study was the 12 federal
circuit courts, because a comprehensive and holistic understanding was obtained about
how a qualified disability is being interpreted in the judicial system. That is, either
against congressional intent or with. It was contemplated to interview disabled
individuals, concerning how they perceive the ADA amendments when trying to procure
or obtain equality in society. Nonetheless, since disabled individuals are protected
individuals of a protected class, it would be problematic to acquire University approval.
For that reason, direct contact with disabled individuals was excluded as a possible
research study. Thus, the research study focused directly on the courts. Other theoretical
frameworks may also be amenable to this research and subsequently evolve as this
research study cultivates and progresses. As elucidated by Creswell (1994), qualitative
research does not necessarily commence with a pertinent theory. However, "theory may
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emerge during the data collection and analysis phase or be used relatively late in the
research process as a basis for comparison with other theories" (pp. 94-95). Therefore,
taking Creswell's (1994) thought process, I remained cognizant of alternating theories
that have emerged during the data process.
Certain theories were eliminated from use in this study for a variety of reasons.
The first of these is intentionalism, which according to Clark and Connolly (2006), is a
doctrine wherein the meaning of a given statute is explicit, as to legislature’s intent.
However, the primary difference between intentionalism and textualism is that
intentionalism does consider legislative history, whereas, textualism inherently does not,
as textualism primarily focuses on the words and plain meaning of the statute within its
current context. Thus, because it is unconcealed that the judiciary openly used textualism
to determine words and their pertinent meanings within the statute, and did not look to
legislative intent that intentionalism was not an ideal theoretical candidate.
Secondly, pragmatism was also not used as a theoretical framework because it
“focuses on the role of the reader in giving meaning to the statute by interpreting it”
(Clark & Connolly, 2006, p. 18). Furthermore, pragmatism adheres to the thinking that a
single meaning of a statute is not objective, and various other ways of thinking
concerning interpretations are allowable (Clark & Connolly, 2006). Therefore, and as
suggested above, the judiciary did not determine that the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990 concerning congressional intent, as meaning something else when interpreting,
but focused on specific words and their meanings to interpret what they believed to be
ambiguous. Hence, pragmatism was also deemed not to be an ideal contender.
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And, thirdly, punctuated equilibrium theory (PET), typically "explains why and
how political processes, generally characterized by stability and incrementalism produce
large scale departures from the past" (Sabatier & Weible, 2014, p. 368). Hence, PET was
not selected because the implementation of the ADA never fundamentally had stability
from the onset, and did not produce a large-scale departure from its primary premise.
Fourthly, whereas diffusion of innovations (DOI), is dominantly associated with
"how policies diffuse across states and other jurisdictions" (Sabatier & Weible, 2014),
this theory was not selected because the ADA was inherently being interpreted from the
onset in a restrictive manner throughout the judiciary, and was not fundamentally
divergent, in judiciary interpretation.
Fifth, narrative policy framework (NPF) was also not selected as a pertinent
theory. NPF "looks at how narratives influence public opinion, how these narratives are
structured, and how they reflect policy beliefs" (Sabatier & Weible, 2014, p. 368).
Because the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and its subsequent amendments are
dominantly found in legal jurisprudence, understanding how narratives correlate about
public opinion would be of little assistance for understanding why the judiciary
misinterpreted congressional intent. Ideally, it was not because of any pertinent narrative
in public policy that formulated the judiciary's opinion that the ADA was ambiguous, and
thus, needing judiciary interpretation.
Sixth, advocacy coalition framework (ACF) was not selected as a relevant theory
because it "digs into questions around coalition formulation and learning for example"
(Sabatier & Weible, 2014, p 368). However, the ACF might be a pertinent theory that
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could be used about understanding judiciary subversion, if there could be a correlation in
the judicial system wherein an appropriate alliance was formulated and intentionally tried
to subvert congressional intent. Logically, this does not seem to be a realistic endeavor.
And finally, both social construction framework (SCF) and policy feedback
theory (PFT) "address policy formulation and change, they focus more on questions of
policy design and dynamics, such as the feedback of policies into society" (Sabatier &
Weible, 2014, p. 386). Although it could be argued that both SCF and PFT might be used
to understand the inception of the ADA, and as to how the ADA would implement
change by asking questions that would elicit feedback after ADA implementation into
society. This theory grants little assistance in understanding why the judiciary
misinterpreted congressional intent as to a qualified disability when it seemed that
Congress’ Act was self-evident as to their primary purpose about disabled individuals,
and what was asserted as a qualified disability under the Act. For the reasons depicted
above, these theories were not chosen, because they do not deal with understanding how
the courts deal with ambiguity.
Limitations
The limitations concerning methodological weaknesses is that using only archival
data does not necessarily produce a correlation between how attorneys perceive the
ADAAA and the archival data. However, understanding the written holdings in the
circuits did provide a correct understanding of how the judiciary is interpreting qualified
disability, post-ADA amendments. Nevertheless, this alternative perception can be
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obtained with future research after it is understood how the judiciary is interpreting a
qualified disability, (i.e., with or against congressional intent).
Significance of Study
This study promoted knowledge, as to whether the judiciary is adhering to
congressional intent when interpreting a qualified disability under ADA amendments.
That is, were they still finding ambiguity even with Congress’ expanded clarification of
what is a qualified disability? And what disabilities, as well as impairments are now
being considered a qualified disability under the new ADA amendments? This study is
important to the legal community, because it answered the question whether the ADA
amendments were having Congress’ intended impact on disabled individuals.
Furthermore, and as asserted by the noted literature, six years have passed since the
implementation of the ADA amendments, and now new empirical evidence is available
to ascertain this salient posited question, thus, making this study ripe for review.
Last, this study impacted knowledge for legal professionals when bringing forth a
prima facie case before the judiciary, but also benefits Congress, EEOC, and other legal
professionals when understanding the current temperament regarding judiciary
interpretation of ADA amendments. This study illuminates to the disabled community
whether the ADA amendments are promoting equality for disabled individuals in society,
as well as procuring or sustaining gainful employment. Thus, the social impact that this
study acquired was a comprehensive understanding concerning how the ADA
amendments when adjudicated in the courts have encouraged advantageous social change
for disabled individuals.
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Summary
In summary, Chapter 1 elucidated the background of this study concerning the
implementation of the ADA and successive amendments. The ADA amendments’
primary challenge was identified as to how the judicial system is interpreting a qualified
disability, post amendments, as well as what disabilities and impairments are currently
being considered in the judiciary, post-ADA amendments. This challenge was suggested
due to reviews of peer-reviewed literature asserting that the ADA amendments do not
fundamentally overcome difficulties found in the former ADA. This was because
Congress only expounded upon a qualified disability, and suggested to the judiciary that a
qualified disability should be broadly interpreted, but not how broad, thus granting
judiciary interpretation yet again.
The primary purpose of this study was articulated to understand how the judiciary
is currently interpreting a qualified disability after ADA amendments and impairments
collectively among the federal circuit courts. And whether the posited literature declared
as previously asserted is correct, that there is a strong likelihood the judicial system will
continue to misinterpret congressional intent despite congressional clarification.
The nature of the study concerning its methodology was articulated as being
qualitative in nature and the research design as case study, primarily because case studies
help to answer how and why a phenomenon happened (O'Sullivan, Rassel, & Berner,
2008). The data sources were depicted, and all 12 federal circuit courts were selected as
the primary locations for procuring data sources. The archival data was depicted as
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adjudicated ADAAA cases from 2009 through current date to assist with this research
endeavor.
The theoretical framework was identified as being textualism because judiciary
interpretation concerning the ADA used the plain meaning in the statute vis-à-vis their
words and phrases to ascertain a qualified disability. And in the predictor cases noted
above that textualism is still being used to interpret the ADAAA. The definition of terms
was articulated to assist in the understanding of legal terminology that may not be
characteristically understood by the reader, as well as other terminologies used
throughout this study that may not be readily understood or known by the reader.
Subsequently, an enumerated list of assumptions was also offered, scope and limitations
concerning methodological weaknesses, and all United States Court of Appeals or circuit
courts were selected for the geographical location.
Last, the primary significance of this study is to understand how the judiciary is
interpreting a qualified disability as noted throughout. This understanding supported not
only disabled individuals when procuring or sustaining gainful employment, but further
supported the legal community, and litigating attorneys when bringing forth a prima facie
case, Congress, and the EEOC. Therefore, the primary focus that will ensue in Chapter 2
will identify peer-reviewed articles, law reviews, statutes, congressional floor debates,
House of Representatives Bills, Senate Bills, and other legal authorities that directly
speak to the problem addressed throughout this study. Chapter 3 will introduce the
research and rationale, methodology, role of the researcher, developed instruments and
collection of instruments, procedures for recruitment, participation and data collection,
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data analysis plan, issue of trustworthiness, and ethical procedures; and Chapter 4 will
introduce the data results. Last, Chapter 5 will provide a discussion of the data,
conclusion, and recommendation for further studies.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
The literature review presents background on the judicial interpretation of a
“qualified disability” under the Americans with Disability Act of 1990, as Amended
(ADAAA). The ADA was amended in 2009 by Congress because, in its view, the
judiciary had misapplied congressional intent as to the meaning of a qualifying disability
(42 U.S.C. note: §12101 (a) (3); Webber, 2014; Valenti, 2014; NCD, 2013; Befort, 2013;
Cavaliere et al., 2012).
The review relied upon the definition of congressional intent of a qualified
disability throughout. Furthermore, this literature review established that the latter of the
two Congresses that implemented the ADA amendments did not fundamentally change
the direct meaning of a qualified disability; they only suggested that the definition should
be broader in scope (Weber, 2014; Cavaliere, et al., 2012). This literature review has
presented peer-reviewed journals, law reviews, congressional bills, statutes, federal
district and circuit court opinions, debated in a scholarly manner, concerning this
phenomenon, while utilizing a purposive criterion sample
This literature review was organized from a historical format providing a
comprehensive overview of the ADA of 1990, as well as the ADA amendments. The first
part of this literature review addressed why the ADA of 1990 was passed, and subsequent
challenges that ensued. Supreme Court cases were analyzed, which strictly narrowed
Congress’ intent of a qualified disability, ultimately disallowing numerous qualified
individuals from acquiring equality, as well as sustaining or procuring gainful
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employment, when bringing forth a prima facie discriminatory case before the courts. It
was also prudent to clarify Congress’ new Findings and Purposes within 42 U.S.C. note:
§12101, in which Congress explicitly defined a qualified disability, as well as the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) powers as a regulatory agency for the
ADAAA.
Hence, understanding that the EEOC’s clarified and expanded regulatory powers
addressed by Congress is extremely salient because, by doing so, they have assisted in the
current shaping of judicial interpretation as to what exactly is a qualified disability under
the Act. Last, predictor cases of ADAAA have been analyzed to validate the current
scholarly literature proposed throughout this literature review that the ADA amendments
do not solve the challenges of a qualified disability in the judiciary. That is, there are still
many ways for the courts to find ambiguity, despite congressional clarification in the
amendments (Webber, 2014; Valenti, 2014; NCD, 2013; Befort, 2013; Cavaliere et al.,
2012).
Literature Search Strategy
To identify prospective, peer-reviewed articles and books, the following databases
were used: Walden University electronic library, ProQuest, governmental websites,
Library of Congress, Google Scholar, and LexisNexis legal database were searched for
the years of 1990–2016 using the following keywords: qualified disability, qualified
impairment, The Americans with Disability Act of 1990, and The Americans with
Disability Act Amended Act. I used the Boolean operators, AND and OR to optimize the
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results. Abstracts were used to judge an article’s relevancy to the research questions. The
references of significant articles were scanned for additional sources.
Theoretical Framework Expanded
The theoretical framework used for this study is textualism, as asserted in Chapter
1. Typically, a theoretical framework serves best if it can answer two fundamental and
specific questions (University of Southern California, 2017). First, identify the research
problem or question, and second, how attainable is the theoretical approach to ascertain
an appropriate solution to the research problem or question than other subsequent
theoretical frameworks (University of Southern California, 2017). As previously
established in Chapter 1, textualism was widely used by the judiciary to ascertain
congressional intent when the judiciary felt ambiguity existed in the ADA of 1990
(Parmet, 2000). And current scholarly literature, as well as new case precedent has been
addressed in subsequent paragraphs, which posited that textualism is still being used to
understand statutory intent when interpreting ADA amendments (Dorrian, 2014; Webber,
2014; Cavaliere et al., 2012). Chapter 1 previously conscripted further possible
theoretical frameworks, and provided pertinent reasons as to why those theoretical
frameworks were not warranted as a leading contender in this study. Therefore,
textualism as a theoretical framework will measure what type of relationships exist, if
any, as to judiciary interpretation and congressional intent of a qualified disability, postADA amendments.
The primary research problem presented in the scholarly literature, as a pertinent
gap, is that the judiciary collectively still has the ability to interpret a qualified disability,
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and other portions of the Act, post-ADA amendments, primarily because the amendments
do not overcome previous ADA challenges (Webber, 2014; Cavaliere et al., 2012).
Moreover, will the judiciary observe congressional clarification that ADA amendments
need to be interpreted broadly regarding a qualified disability? And what disabilities and
impairments are now being considered a qualified disability under the Act’s more explicit
explanation?
Subsequently, the use of textualism as a theoretical framework has assisted in
discovering whether the judiciary ought to rely upon textualism as its primary statutory
interpretation tool when it fails in granting, or leading to, congressional intent during
judiciary interpretation. If factual, that textualism is not aiding congressional intent then,
consequently, Congress would need to formulate a more precise and concise statutory
tool to explicitly detail congressional intent. Therefore, the using of textualism as a
theoretical framework has demonstrated that the judiciary, in the past, has applied the use
of textualism to interpret the ADA incorrectly. And current scholarly literature and cases
presented suggested that textualism is still being used as a statutory tool to understand
ADA amendments and not looking at legislative intent when doing so (Dorrian, 2014;
Webber, 2014; Cavaliere et al., 2012).
Pragmatically, and because of the past history of the ADA of 1990, leading to
being amended, it would only seem logical for the courts to look toward legislative or
congressional intent, since Congress specifically asserted in their amendments that the
judiciary had severely misinterpreted their intent (42 U.S.C. 12101 note). Reasonably, if
the judiciary, specifically with ADA amendments should find ambiguity or uncertainty in
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the statute, that it should now be a perfunctory method to utilize legislative intent if faced
with such ambiguities or uncertainties. Conversely, in the data analysis, which will ensue
in Chapter 4 and 5, in all instances of cases directly examined in this study, that
textualism was still widely used to interpret the ADAAA and not looking toward
legislative intent. However, textualism was not necessarily used to interpret a qualified
disability/impairment solely, but more to what is a reasonable accommodation, regarded
as having a disability prong, undue hardship, as well as other elements that were deemed
to be ambiguous or needing clarification for the courts to ascertain a pertinent position. In
these specific instances, the courts did not directly look to legislative intent and/or
congressional intent and interpreted these ambiguities by using textualism, which will
become evident in Chapter 4 and 5.
Historically textualism in the Supreme Court has often been used as a statutory
interpretive tool to understand statutes as to their plain meaning ascribed in the text
(Rasmussen, 1993). Rasmussen (1993) further asserted that the Supreme Court is
infrequently concerned with legislative intent vis-à-vis legislative history. Similarly,
Clark and Connolly (2006) suggested that textualism, when interpreted by the courts,
relies upon the plain meaning of the statute, and that by doing so “will produce an
interpretation that is neither lenient nor strict" (p. 13). Thus, utilizing the plain meaning
of the text should provide inclusive clarification as to statutory intent (Clark & Connolly,
2006). Often judges who endorse textualism use dictionaries to arrive at the precise
meaning of a word to, or intending to, advance the statute’s plain meaning (Clark &
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Connolly, 2006). However, this can be problematic depending on which dictionaries the
courts utilize to derive the plain meaning of statutory intent (Clark & Connolly, 2006).
As previously suggested the Supreme Court case, Toyota Motor Manufacturing,
Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams (2002) used dictionaries to derive the meaning of
congressional intent when interpreting the ADA of 1990. The Supreme Court directly
used dictionaries when interpreting words, or phrases, such as, major and substantially
limits when deciding how these words or phrases directly apply to a qualified disability.
The Supreme Court further used textualism by looking at the direct wording to
understand how many individuals Congress suggested to relieve under the Act.
Furthermore, this was done by directly pinpointing the numerical number of 43 million as
the end-all number that the Act or ADA pursued to aid vis-à-vis, disabled individuals.
Congress later found that particular number to be against congressional intent, and
that the number of 43 million was not to be interpreted as a direct number that the ADA
of 1990 pursued to aid under the Act (42 U.S.C. note: §12101 (a) (3); Webber, 2014;
Valenti, 2014; NCD, 2013; Befort, 2013; Cavaliere et al., 2012). Hence, Congress
negated Supreme Court rulings that misinterpreted Congress’ intent when the judiciary
used textualism to interpret the Act, for the reason that it did not produce their true intent
for the Act. Therefore, my posited thought process is that textualism when directly used
to interpret the ADA of 1990, and further the ADA amendments, may not be the best
method to determine congressional intent when the judiciary interprets the ADAAA.
In two recent cases, and as noted above, Smothers v. Solway Chemicals Inc., (10th
Cir. 2014), and Ortega v. South Colorado Clinic, P. C., (10th Cir. 2015), that when
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analyzed, it was apparent that the Courts are still utilizing textualism when interpreting
the ADA amendments. Primarily, because both cases determined that a sleep disorder,
now covered under the ADAAA, as depicted in the ADA amendments, did not explicitly
define what quantified a relevant sleep disorder under ADA protection. Thus, a sleep
disorder needs to have a quantified number of doctor visits to establish as a qualified
disability (Stylinski, 2015). The number that was depicted in Smothers v. Solway
Chemicals Inc., (10th Cir. 2014) was 12 doctor visits, and because the Ortega v. South
Colorado Clinic, P. C., (U. S. Dis., 2015) case did not rise to this pertinent number of
doctor visits, it therefore did not meet the requirements of a sleep disorder under the
ADA amendments. In Ortega v. South Colorado Clinic, P. C., (U. S. Dis., 2015), and
more problematic in recent ADAAA rulings, exposed that the Court still relied on preADA court rulings or holdings for certain aspects asserted in their holdings to disavow
ADAAA coverage in Ortega as a proper plaintiff.
In the cases mentioned above, there is no reasoning offered by the courts that they
sought to explore legislative history concerning what established a sleep disorder as to
Congress’ intent. Accordingly, the Courts used textualism to understand that a sleep
disorder is covered under the ADA amendments. However, the judiciary determined that
Congress did not clarify as to what enumerated a sleep disorder under the Act, and that
the Courts interpreted without the help of legislative history, which is indicative of
textualism (Clark & Connolly, 2006). Thus, understanding textualism as a theoretical
framework when analyzing current federal circuit court cases assisted this research
endeavor to understand that the courts’ reliance upon textualism to interpret the ADAAA

42
was the primary catalyst causing problematic judiciary interpretation against
congressional intent. The case known as Nelly v. PSEG Texas (5th Cir., 2013) further
asserted that although ADA amendments implement a less rigorous standard than that of
its predecessor, they still do not preclude the burden of a proper plaintiff to establish his
or her disability as being covered under the ADAAA.
However, under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(B); ADAAA § 2(b)(5) “the question of
whether an individual’s impairment is a disability under the ADA should not demand
extensive analysis” (as cited in Americans with Diabetes Association [for attorneys],
2015, p. 11). Thus, again the circuit court case in Nelly v. PSEG Texas (5th Cir., 2013) is
still looking at the statute in a textualism fashion, as the court is asserting that an
individual still needs to establish his or her disability, but does not address how he or she
will ascertain what is a less stringent standard for a covered disability. Pragmatically, this
question when being interpreted by the judiciary should look to legislative history.
Therefore, textualism has been the theoretical framework used when analyzing
federal circuit court cases directly interpreting a qualified disability, as well as what
disabilities and impairments are now being covered under the new ADA amendments.
Furthermore, what are the specific standards being used by the courts when determining
what disabilities and impairments are covered in the ADAAA? Textualism as a
theoretical framework has aided in understanding the research questions, the problem
statement, and the primary purpose of this doctorate study, by pragmatically looking at
how the courts in the federal circuits are collectively interpreting the ADAAA.
Conversely, it should be noted that the theoretical framework of textualism did not fit
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every case analyzed, but established how the circuit courts are collectively interpreting,
as to its main thought process when faced with ambiguity or unclear ADA amendments.
Nevertheless, the predictor cases asserted above, and those that are illustrated in this
chapter are dominantly emphasizing textualism as being used under the ADAAA.
Why the ADA Was Passed
On July 26, 1990, Congress brought forth a salubrious Act that would help 43
million disabled Americans (Valenti, 2014). The Act would be known as the Americans
with Disability Act of 1990 (ADA), and its primary intent was “to establish a clear and
comprehensive prohibition of discrimination on the basis of disability" (Pub. L. 101-336,
104 Stat. 327, 1990, para. 1). The ADA of 1990 was sponsored by Senator Tom Harkin, a
Democrat from Ohio, in the 101st Congress, and first introduced on May 8, 1989
(Congress.gov, 2015). Subsequently, the ADA of 1990 enjoyed widespread bipartisan
support, as well as having support of then-acting President, George H. W. Bush (Webber,
2014). The 101st Congress 2nd U. S. Senate session votes tallied of the Act were 91 yeas,
6 nays, and 3 not voting (United States Senate, 2015). And in the House of
Representatives tallied votes were 377 yeas, 28 nays, and 27 not voting (Clerk.house.gov,
2015).
This widespread bipartisan support of the ADA of 1990 was considered a historic
piece of legislation for disabled individuals and disability advocates alike (Valenti, 2014;
Cavaliere et al., 2012). Likewise, Waterstone (2015) asserted that the ADA of 1990
fundamentally adopted the original premise of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; however, its
primary intent “was…to express a national sentiment that people with disabilities were to
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be brought into full citizenship” (Waterstone, 2015, p. 833). Waterstone suggested these
sentiments were overtly formulated in the original ADA of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12101(a) (2)
(3) (4), which stated in pertinent part that:
(2) historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with
disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social
problem; (3) discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such
critical areas as employment, housing, public accommodations, education,
transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization, health services,
voting, and access to public services; (4) unlike individuals who have experienced
discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, national origin, religion, or age,
individuals who have experienced discrimination on the basis of disability have
often had no legal recourse to redress such discrimination.
Hence, the noted statute, 42 U.S.C. 12101 (a) (2) (3) (4), of the original ADA of 1990
addressed its primary intent was to assist disabled individuals with the procurement of
equality in a civilized society. Valenti (2014) suggested that committee reports strongly
asserted the ADA of 1990 was intensely needed to address the issue regarding the
necessity to establish a “clear and comprehensive national mandate” (H. R. Rep. No.101
– 485, pt. 2 at 50, 1990) to compel society from discriminatory actions against the
disabled (Valenti, 2014). Bernstein (2014) asserted that the ADA of 1990 unambiguously
expressed disabled individuals are dominantly “a discrete and insular minority" (42
U.S.C. 12101 (b) (1) – (2), 1990; as cited in Bernstein, 2014, p. 127).
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Bernstein (2014) further stated that Congress explained there is a rich need to
protect disabled individuals, primarily “because less than twenty – five percent of
disabled men and only thirteen percent of disabled women have full-time jobs" (p. 127).
Therefore, Congress’ purpose for implementing and promulgating the ADA of 1990 was
not only to address equality of disabled individuals in a civilized society, but to assure
that disabled individuals, when discriminated against in and out of the workplace, could
establish redress against their discriminators. Conversely, the haven that the ADA of
1990 was to offer about absolute preclusion from discriminatory actions against disabled
individuals was profoundly undermined by judiciary interpretation of congressional
intent of a qualified disability (Webber, 2014; Cavaliere, et al., 2012).
ADA Challenges
The ADA of 1990, was implemented to negate “unjustified segregation and
exclusion of persons with disabilities [in] the mainstream of American life” (Switzer,
2001, p. 629; as cited in Valenti, 2014, p. 90). Whereas, Jones (2012) suggested that
before the ADA implementation, disabled individuals were inherently "treated as
worthless or nonexistent, and discriminated against solely on the basis of their
disabilities" (p. 559). As discriminatory cases were brought forth by plaintiff litigants
trying to establish prima facie cases before the courts, the judicial system found that
congressional intent as to a qualified disability was ambiguous, thus, necessitating
interpretation (Porter, 2015). The judicial system determined that Congress’ intent as to
the meaning of a qualified disability was not explicitly defined and in need of
interpretation as to what they believed congressional intent was (Hoffman, 2012).
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Moreover, the most prolific cases that solidified judicial interpretation as to a qualified
disability were Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams (2002) and
Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., (1999), both to be discussed in detail in the subsequent
paragraphs. Thus, it is important to understand explicitly how the judicial system
determined its authority to interpret the ADA statute, as well as how the judicial system
determines when a statute requires such interpretation.
ADA Judiciary Cases that Defined Qualified Disability
According to Bowman (2011) and Miller (2011), the cases that stimulated
judiciary misinterpretation of congressional intent of a qualified disability were
Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkinberg (1999), Murphy v. United Parcel Service (1999), and
Sutton et al., v. United Air Lines (1999). It was in these cases that the judicial system
determined that the ADA needed to be interpreted, because a qualified disability was
ambiguous as to congressional intent (Bowman, 2011; Miller, 2011). Furthermore, these
cases directly led to the Supreme Court case known as Toyota Motor Manufacturing,
Kentucky, Inc., v. Williams (2002), which explicitly necessitated a qualified disability to
be interpreted narrowly by the courts (Bowman, 2011). The Toyota case will be discussed
further in subsequent paragraphs under its own title, but in a brief precis the Supreme
Court reasoned that the respondent’s claim that she was “‘substantially limited’ [in
relation to a] ‘major life activity’” (42 U.S.C. §12 102 (2) (A)) was unfounded, primarily
because the respondent in the noted case could perform:
personal hygiene [and] carrying out personal or household chores… [such as]
bathing, and brushing one’s teeth are among the types of manual tasks of central
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importance to people’s daily lives, and should have been part of the assessment of
whether respondent was substantially limited in performing manual tasks. (Toyota
Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc., v. Williams, 2002, pp. 201 – 202).
Subsequently, and because of this ruling, according to Chen (2015), before the courts
would allow a discrimination suit to move past summary disposition, the court first
needed to address whether the litigant was a qualified individual under the Act. And once
the Supreme Court in the Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc., v. Williams
(2002) ruling established that if an individual could perform simple tasks, such as
brushing one’s teeth, a determination was made that he/she was therefore not deemed to
be disabled, and thus, not a qualified member under the Act.
The Court also reasoned that because the respondent could do household chores,
and had the ability to brush his/her teeth, these repetitive tasks did not severely restrict
the respondent, and could not constitute in establishing a severe restriction in relation to
central importance of an individual’s daily life’s regime (Toyota Motor Manufacturing,
Kentucky, Inc., v. Williams, 2002). This reasoning by the Supreme Court led them to
uphold the lower Court’s ruling for summary disposition. Typically, a motion for
summary judgment, or summary disposition, is deemed to be appropriate "if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law" (Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (a); as cited in Cosgrove, Fink,
Dillion, & Wedding, 2015, p. 44). However, if a litigant could establish they were a
protected individual under the ADA of 1990 "[t]hen the court must decide whether the
[individual] was disabled" (Chen, 2015, p. 161). Due to the Toyota Motor Manufacturing,
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Kentucky, Inc., v. Williams (2002) ruling, it became extremely laborious, if not
impossible, for a disabled litigant to establish a qualified disability in the judiciary with
these new restricting definitions implemented by the Supreme Court (Valenti, 2014). To
that end, over 90% of ADA litigants could never surpass the threshold in the judicial
system to qualify as disabled under the ADA of 1990, and thus, litigant cases were
generally dismissed during motion hearings for summary judgment (Crosgrove, Fink,
Dillion, & Wedding, 2015; Chen, 2015; Valenti, 2014).
As asserted throughout this dissertation, the ADA of 1990 defined a disability as
“a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual; a record of such an impairment; or being regarded as having
such an impairment" (42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2) (A) – (C), 2012; as cited in Chen, 2015, p.
161). Thus, the Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc., v. Williams (2002)
Supreme Court decision disallowed many individuals from establishing a discriminatory
case before the courts (Bowman, 2011; & Miller, 2011). Simply, disabled individuals
could not establish their disability claim in a court of law, because of the Supreme
Court’s narrow definition of a qualified disability (Bowman, 2011; & Miller, 2011). An
earlier Supreme Court case, known as Sutton v. United Air Lines (1999), established that
an individual was not disabled under the ADA of 1990 if that disability was ameliorated,
or mitigated (McCrone, 2011), that is, if the disability could be corrected by or through
medication, or an apparatus, subsequently an individual was no longer disabled, and thus,
not protected under the ADA of 1990.
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Moreover, Miller (2011) suggested that the ADA intent was misinterpreted when
Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkinberg (1999) established that a disabled individual could not
qualify as being disabled, or substantially limited in a major life activity if "after applying
mitigating measures [it] may help one function better" (Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkinberg,
1999, p. 527; as cited in Miller, 2011, p. 51); hence, the individual was no longer deemed
disabled, because the disability was ostensibly corrected (Miller, 2011). This was even
despite the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulatory guidelines,
in 29 C.F.R. 1630.2 (j) (1998), explicated a "disability to be assessed in its pre-corrected
state" (Miller, 2011, p. 51). Miller (2011) asserted that an employer could pragmatically
regulate if "physical characteristics or medical conditions that do not rise to the level of
an impairment… [or that] some limiting, but not substantially limiting, impairments
[would] make individuals less than ideally suited for a job" (Sutton v. United Air Lines,
1999, pp. 490-491).
Last, Miller (2011) continued that Sutton v. United Air Lines (1999) "held that [a]
disability had to significantly limit one's ability to perform ‘a broad class of jobs’ not
merely one specific job, to satisfy the ‘substantially limited’ requirement" (Sutton v.
United Air Lines, 1999, p. 491; as cited in Miller, 2011, p. 51). The court was quick to
incorporate the EEOC's pre-ADA requirement concerning an impairment, if that
impairment "significantly restrict[s] one's ability to perform either a class of jobs or a
broad range of jobs" (29 C.F.R. 1630.2 (j) (3) (i), 1998; as cited in Miller, 2011, p. 51).
The key words in the quote above that were deemed problematic by Congress during the
amendments were significantly restricted, which was then deemed by Congress to be too
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demanding of a standard (42 U.S.C. 12101 note: (a) (8)). Hence, the cases known as
Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkinberg (1999), Murphy v. United Parcel Service (1999), and
Sutton v. United Air Lines (1999) all established precedent that narrowly defined a
qualified disability granting viability to the case known as Toyota Motor Manufacturing,
Kentucky, Inc., v. Williams (2002).
Significance of the Toyota case (2002) and the ADA
The precedent established in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc., v.
Williams (2002) significantly narrowed the definition of a qualified disability in that the
court interpreted the ADA of 1990 concerning "major life activities as" (Knapp, 2013, p.
721) "those activities that are of central importance to daily life" (Toyota Motor
Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc., v. Williams, 2002, p. 185; as cited in Knapp, 2013, p.
721). Knapp (2013) suggested the courts held that their interpretation of the ADA's
qualified disability "need[s] to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for
qualifying as disabled" (Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc., v. Williams, 2002
p. 197; as cited in Knapp, 2013, p. 721). This strict interpretation asserted by the Supreme
Court established that disabled individuals were either "not ‘disabled enough’ to warrant
protection under the Act or were ‘too disabled’ to qualify for the jobs they desired"
(Knapp, 2013, p. 721). Knapp’s (2013) statements relied upon the Toyota Motor
Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc., v. Williams (2002) holding that “[w]hen addressing the
major life activity of performing manual tasks, the central inquiry must be whether the
claimant is unable to perform the variety of tasks central to most people’s daily lives" (p.
200 – 201).
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Knapp (2013) further suggested that employment discrimination cases only
displayed a 2.7% triumph for litigants, and litigants that filed non-employment
discriminatory cases only succeeded 17.2% of the time. Whereas, Valenti (2014) asserted
that in the "first seven years after [ADA’s] passage, defendant employers won 94% of
cases at the trial court level, and 84% of cases appealed by losing plaintiffs" (Colker,
2005; as cited in Valenti, 2014, p. 90). Subsequently, because the ADA of 1990 was
promoted to help 43 million Americans, the Supreme Court inferred that this number
expressed how many individuals Congress intended to assist; and those with only
impairments were not part of Congress’ intent for protection under the ADA of 1990
(Valenti, 2014; Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc., v. Williams, 2002).
The Supreme Court in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc., v. Williams
(2002) further asserted that if Congress intended for more individuals to establish a
qualified disability under the Act, that the stated number would be greater than 43 million
(Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc., v. Williams, 2002). Beffort (2013) asserted
that Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc., v. Williams (2002) further held
"’substantially limits’[and] ‘major life activity’ ‘need be interpreted strictly to create a
demanding standard for qualifying as disabled’" (Toyota Motor Manufacturing,
Kentucky, Inc., v. Williams, 2002, pp. 196 – 197; Beffort, 2013, p. 2037).
Hoffman (2012) suggested, and pointed out, that the Supreme Court case
determined that the words or phrase, substantially limits would conclude that "to be
substantially limited… an individual must have an impairment that prevents or severely
restricts the individual from doing activities that are of central importance to most
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people's daily lives" (Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc., v. Williams, 2002, pp.
196 – 197; as cited in Hoffman, 2012, p. 917). The case expanded that the words, or
phrase, substantially limits need be interpreted in a more restrictive manner, which
precluded most impairments from being deemed, no matter what, a disability (Toyota
Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc., v. Williams, 2002). Subsequently, the Supreme
Court looked at what major life activities are under the Act, which the Court determined
that congressional intent was silent and needed interpretation (Hoffman, 2012).
The Supreme Court case preceded to define major by looking up the definition in
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, and determined that the fundamental
meaning meant “important” (Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc., v. Williams,
2002; as cited in Hoffman, 2012). Thus, the court concluded that the definition of major
in relation to major life activities would now be activities that are of central importance
to daily life (Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc., v. Williams, 2002; as cited in
Hoffman, 2012).
Hoffman (2012) further asserted that the court manipulated the wording of the
Act, and established that if an individual who was disabled, but was utilizing corrective
measures to correct their disability, such a disability was determined null and void. Last,
the court expounded and concurred with Sutton v. United Air Lines (1999), in the sense
that Congress had originally established 43 million Americans would benefit from the
ADA of 1990. Furthermore, and contrariwise, this "figure reflects an understanding that
those whose impairments are largely corrected by medication or other devices are not
‘disabled’ in the meaning of the ADA" (Sutton v. United Air Lines, 1999; as cited in
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Hoffman, 2012, p. 922). Therefore, Sutton and Toyota dominantly misinterpreted
congressional intent as to a qualified disability under the Act with its narrow definitions.
This forced Congress to implement amendments to the ADA to explicitly define
congressional intent as to a qualified disability (McCormick, 2015).
Understanding Congressional Overrides of U.S Supreme Court Cases
It should be noted that Congress can negate Supreme Court decisions when those
decisions are reasoned to be in direct conflict or simply disruptive to congressional intent.
This is salient because many perceive Supreme Court decisions to be the end-all with no
pertinent or simple remedy. According to Christiansen and Eskridge (2014), “[o]nce upon
a time, law professors, and political scientists assumed that the Supreme Court was…the
final word on matters of statutory interpretation” (p. 317). However, and as previously
stated, Congress can merely implement congressional overrides when Supreme Court
decisions or the judiciary are misinterpreting congressional intent (Christiansen &
Eskridge, 2014). The case known as Neal v. United States (1996) explained that it is
Congress’ responsibility “to correct statutes that are thought to be unwise or unfair" (p.
295). To that end, Congress can negate Supreme Court decisions by purely amending the
statute that was misinterpreted by a Supreme Court ruling, which negates the Supreme
Court decision, and grants no further validity.
What’s New in the ADA Amendments
According to Hsieh (2014), Congress negated the precedents that were largely
established in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc., v. Williams (2002) opinion,
as well as Sutton v. United Air Lines (1999) when Congress implemented the ADA
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amendments in 2009. Hsieh (2014) asserted that the ADA amendments should assist
litigants when bringing forth a prima facie case before the courts about disability
discrimination, as Congress had further expanded as to their congressional intent. Thus,
now litigants would not be subjected to early dismissal if a motion was filed by the
defense for summary judgment. Travis (2012) elucidated that scholars perceived that the
ADAAA would fundamentally restore congressional intent for a qualified disability for
disabled Americans. However, to clarify the changes to the ADA of 1990 versus the
ADA after amendments, it has been necessary and prudent to evaluate the new ADA with
the subsequent amendments to establish why Congress negated the Supreme Court
rulings, and how they expected a qualified disability would be interpreted in the judicial
system. Congress established in the ADA amendments under 42 U.S.C. 12101 note:
Findings and Purpose of ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-325, § 2, Sept. 25,
2008, 122 Stat. 3553 that:
(a) Findings:
Congress finds that-(1) in enacting the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(ADA), Congress intended that the Act "provide a clear and comprehensive
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities" and provide broad coverage; (2) in enacting the ADA, Congress
recognized that physical and mental disabilities in no way diminish a person's
right to fully participate in all aspects of society, but that people with physical or
mental disabilities are frequently precluded from doing so because of prejudice,
antiquated attitudes, or the failure to remove societal and institutional barriers; (3)
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while Congress expected that the definition of disability under the ADA would be
interpreted consistently with how courts had applied the definition of a
handicapped individual under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, that expectation has
not been fulfilled. (42 U.S.C. 12101 note: (a) (1) (2) (3), 2008).
Congress would further acknowledge that the Supreme Court holdings in Sutton, and
Toyota, and other cohort cases, had narrowed the anticipated wide protection that the
ADA of 1990 was supposed to offer disabled individuals, as well as those with
impairments (42 U.S.C. 12101 note: (a) (4) (5) (6), 2008). Congress addressed that the
EEOC’s definition concerning the term substantially limits to mean significantly
restricted are not Congress’ intent, because it is too high a standard (42 U.S.C. 12101
note: (a) (6) (7) (8), 2008).
Congress subsequently turned their attention to the primary purpose of the ADA,
and succeeding amendments by elucidating their purposes in the Act, which states in
pertinent part that:
(b) Purposes:
The purposes of this Act are to carry out the ADA's objectives of providing "a
clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination"
and "clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination" by
reinstating a broad scope of protection to be available under the ADA; (2) to
reject the requirement enunciated by the Supreme Court in Sutton v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) and its companion cases that whether an
impairment substantially limits a major life activity is to be determined with
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reference to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures; (3) to reject the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471
(1999) with regard to coverage under the third prong of the definition of disability
and to reinstate the reasoning of the Supreme Court in School Board of Nassau
County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) which set forth a broad view of the third
prong of the definition of handicap under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. (42
U.S.C. 12101 note: (b) (1) (2) (3), 2008).
Moreover, Congress would articulate in the subsequent paragraphs of its purposes of the
Act, largely outlining the deficiencies of the Supreme Court rulings concerning how they
narrowed and misinterpreted the primary intent of the ADA of 1990 for disabled
individuals. Thus, the EEOC henceforth would be required to acknowledge the primary
purposes of the Act that Congress intended, and furthermore that the EEOC would be
consistent when revising their definition of substantially limits not to be significantly
restricted (42 U.S.C. 12101 note: (b) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8), 2008).
Although Congress explained their main purpose for the ADA and amendments,
they did not explicitly state how broad a qualified disability should be interpreted, only
not to encompass "extensive analysis" (42 U.S.C. note: (b) (5), 2008). Congress stated in
its findings section that "‘substantially limits’ to require a greater degree of limitation
than was intended by Congress" (42 U.S.C. note: (a) (7), 2008). Again, Congress did not
explicitly define what a "greater degree of limitation" (42 U.S.C. note: (a) (7), 2008) was,
only greater (Webber, 2014). Congress also did not overtly redefine a qualified disability
and used the same wording as the original ADA when defining such, that is, "a physical
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or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such
individual; a record of such an impairment; or being regarded as having such an
impairment..." (42 U.S.C. 12102 (1) (A) (B) (C), 2008). This same wording could cause
the judicial system to misinterpret congressional intent, because a disability was not
redefined, only expanded upon (Webber, 2014).
Congress did define what major life activities in general should encompass, and
stated that, "major life activities include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting,
bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating,
and working" (42 U.S.C. 12102 (2) (A) (1), 2008). The ADA amendments now include
major bodily functions and state that "a major life activity also includes the operation of a
major bodily function, including but not limited to, functions of the immune system,
normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory,
circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions" (42 U.S.C. 12102 (2) (B) (1), 2008).
Thus, Congress explicitly clarifying their intent for a qualified disability.
Understanding Congressional Delegation to the EEOC
Congress’ amendments to the ADA explicitly clarified the EEOC's regulatory
power when enforcing the ADA as Amended (42 U.S.C. 12205a). Congress also granted
authority to the EEOC, explicitly stating that “the authority to issue regulations granted to
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission…under this chapter includes the
authority to issue regulations implementing the definitions of disability” (42 U.S.C.
12205a). Greenberg (2014) asserted that the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recently
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affirmed congressional intent about EEOC's interpretive power in the case known as
Summers v. Altarum Inst., Corp., (2014).
However, Greenberg (2014) proposed that the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
was the first appellate court since the ADA amendments to grant the EEOC deference
concerning their interpretive powers. And it is unknown at this time if other appellate
courts will act in tandem (Greenberg, 2014). Whereas, Williams, Devaux, Fuschetti, and
Salmon (2013) asserted "[t]he EEOC regulations of the amended ADA reinforce the
reduce threshold" (ADA Amendments Act (2) (b), 122 Stat. at 3554; as cited in Williams
et al., 2013, p. 115). Furthermore, Williams et al. (2013) emphasized that EEOC's current
regulations should allow disabled individuals explicit coverage when establishing a
qualified disability under the Act. However, Congress did clarify that the EEOC needs to
amend its current regulations defining the term substantially limits as significantly
restricted to properly fit with the new Act, as well as the amendments in the Act (42
U.S.C. (b) (6), 2008).
Congress also illuminated that the EEOC’s "ADA regulations defining the term
"substantially limits" as "significantly restricted" are inconsistent with congressional
intent, by expressing too high a standard (42 U.S.C. 12101 note: (a) (8), 2008). Congress
identified the EEOC as a regulatory agency regarding the definition of disability, as well
as definitions implemented in the new amendments (42 U.S.C. 12205a). Although,
Congress defined the EEOC's regulatory power, they did address preceding challenges
with their regulatory rules with past ADA regulations inserting the "‘term substantially
limits’ [to not be defined as] ‘significantly restricts’" (42 U.S.C. note: (b) (6), 2008). The
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EEOC's definition of the term was inherently too restricting, and misinterpreted
congressional intent.
According to Kim (2015), the amendments implemented in 1972 in relation to
Title VII which "preserved the earlier structure mandating that aggrieved individuals file
charges with the EEOC as a prerequisite to a private suit and requiring the EEOC to
investigate those charges and to seek conciliation before filing suit" (Occidental Life Ins.
Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 1977, pp. 359-360; as cited in Kim, 2015, p. 1137). The EEOC
(2015a) stated that fundamentally the legalities of implementing a discriminatory
complaint first be initiated by and through administrative proceedings to settle a
discriminatory complaint; however, if it should become clear that this would be an
exercise in futility, or that no settlement could be negotiated, the discriminatory
complaint might then formally proceed in the courts. Nevertheless, there are some
exceptions, (e.g., suing due to age discrimination, or under the equal pay act) (EEOC,
2015). The EEOC also has authority to sue on behalf of a discriminated disabled
individual from the statutory language in Title VII (General Telephone Co. of the
Northwest v. EEOC, 1988; as cited in Allbright, 2011).
Limitations of EEOC Regulatory Power Concerning the ADA
Despite, congressional intent regarding EEOC regulatory power, Allbright (2011)
asserted that the EEOC's ability to do so was diminished due to economic resources,
notwithstanding its statutory responsibility. Further, Allbright (2011) suggested that
although "funding levels for the agency have been roughly level for the past several
years…the number of authorized personnel has declined" (p. 1143). Recently "in 2012,
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federal courts across the nation issued rulings that strike at the heart of the EEOC's
attempts to secure a broad interpretation of the limitations period under section 707 of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1984" (Maatman & Strumwasser, 2013, para. 1). This
would preclude the EEOC from filing a discriminatory claim under Title VII Section 707
if the claim is 300 days old for the alleged discrimination (Maatman & Strumwasser,
2013). Maatman and Strumwasser asserted that the statute of limitations applied to the
statute is extremely obfuscating in nature and in need of interpretation by the Court of
Appeals, or Supreme Court.
If the EEOC is obligated to adhere to the 300-day rule, its declining economic
resources, as well as declining personnel, will further constrain the EEOC from bringing
forth such discriminatory suits. Thus, the ability for the EEOC to effectively bringing
forth lawsuits on behalf of discriminated litigants, as Congress intended, will become
somewhat specious if the 300-day rule is adhered to in the courts. Primarily, because this
will add to the current vast and immense workload existing in the EEOC. Another
formidable problem the EEOC is now currently facing in relation to the rise of
discriminatory complaints by disabled individuals, is retaliation claims under Title VII,
which increased by 1,500 cases during the period between 2010 through 2012 (LongDaniels & Hall, 2013). In 2014, the EEOC reported 88,778 discriminatory complaints;
which entailed 25,369 (28.6 %) (EEOC, 2015b, 2014, para. 7).
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 grants the EEOC litigation
power under the Act and the ADA amendments illuminated the EEOC's explicit power in
regulating the ADAAA (42 U.S.C. 12205a). Congress’ intent for EEOC regulatory power
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is clear in the ADAAA, which grants them statutory obligation to oversee the ADAAA
and implement regulations accordingly. However, with seemingly never-ending EEOC
complaints, Congress’ primary intention for the EEOC may simply become too
burdensome for the EEOC to adjudicate over. Therefore, the EEOC may not be able to
implement congressional intent and assist the courts with subsequent interpretation
concerning the ADAAA, when needed.
Literature Gap
Presently, the gap in current literature is about how the federal judiciary is
collectively interpreting qualified disability post-ADA amendments. And will the judicial
system adhere to congressional clarification that the ADA amendments need to be
interpreted broadly, regarding a qualified disability (42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq)? Moreover,
what types of disabilities and impairments are, or are not, now being considered as a
qualified disability under judicial interpretation? According to Valenti (2014), Webber
(2014), Cavaliere et al. (2012), there are yet multiple ways for the judiciary to
misinterpret congressional intent because the amendments do not inherently overcome
the past of the ADA. Valenti (2014) Webber, (2014), Cavaliere et al. (2012), have all
further proclaimed that research concerning by what means is a qualified disability being
interpreted in the judiciary system; it remains essential to understand if the judiciary is
adhering to congressional intent. Webber further suggested that the courts would
misinterpret congressional intent primarily because Congress did not explicitly specify
how a qualified disability should be interpreted, only that the clarification threshold
should inherently be lowered. Travis (2012) emphasized that since the ADAAA has been

62
implemented, and is presently being interpreted in the judiciary the time has come to
extract a better understanding that the ADA offers a disabled litigant under the new
ADAAA.
After Congress implemented the ADAAA and expounded its primary intent for
the Act, that subsequent cases under the new amendments did not formulate a fruitful
impact when brought forth before the courts (Allbright, 2011). Moreover, Allbright
(2011) asserted that in her survey of 446 cases, only 6 disability discriminatory suits were
victorious, with 335 embodied employer victories and 105 of the discriminatory
employment suits brought forth by plaintiff litigants ended with "no resolution of the
merits" (2011, para. 6). Comparing the federal circuits "the Fifth Circuit – for the second
year in a row – had the highest percentage of employee wins at 7.3, followed by the Sixth
and Seventh Circuits at 2.9 and 2.4, respectively. Employees had no wins [in] 8 Circuits"
(Allbright, 2011, para. 6). Allbright (2011) further stated that discriminatory suits brought
forth by plaintiff litigants claiming a disability before the courts largely failed when
trying to present "a prima facie case of discrimination" (para. 8). Allbright additionally
asserted that cases were dismissed during summary judgment when defendant litigants
argued that plaintiff litigants were not disabled, and proffered no protection under the
ADAAA. Lastly, Allbright explained that a 1. % reduction of EEOC filed complaints
were seen after amendments. Thus, Allbright surmised that the ADAAA offered
diminutive results in its first year of passage (2011).
Creta (2014) asserted that many of the federal circuit courts are determining that
Congress intended the ADA to be a non-affirmative action statute, and because the statute
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is an anti-discrimination statute, it precludes disabled individuals from acquiring
preferential treatment because of their disability when competing with a non-disabled
individual for the same or similar job. Nevertheless, the ADA amendments specify in the
statute a reassignment clause for disabled individuals; thus far, in two recent United
States Supreme Court cases Jackson v. Fuji Photo Film, Inc., (2012), and EEOC v.
United Air Lines, Inc., (2013) the courts have "decline(d) to confront the ADA's
reassignment clause" (Creta, 2014, p. 1709). Creta (2014) also suggested that the
legislative history of the ADA, as well as the EEOC’s enforcement guidance put forward
automatic reassignment for disabled employees who are eligible for such reassignment.
However, despite the amendments, individuals may have expanded protection under the
Act, yet there are numerous ways for the courts to misinterpret Congress’ intent
(McKendall, Holland & Knight, 2011). For example, utilizing the reasonable
accommodations and reassignment clause under the ADA, and because this is still an area
that is not explicitly defined by Congress, thus allowing judicial interpreting, which could
be contrary to congressional intent (Brennan, 2014).
Therefore, remembering that 42 U.S.C. 12102 (1) (A) (B) (C) defined a disability
as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities of such individual; a record of such an impairment; or being regarded as having
such an impairment" that "substantially limits one or more major life activity" 42 U.S.C.
12102 (1) (A) (B) (C)) was significantly misinterpreted by the judiciary, which forced
Congress to implement amendments to the ADA to express congressional intent of a
qualified disability (Fairclough, Robinson, Nicholas, Cousley, 2013). Webber (2014)
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asserted that the ADA amendments are "‘instructional amendments’ which direct the
courts to reject the prior precedent and to interpret the same statutory language in a
different way" (p. 307). Hence, if the judicial system determines the amendments are still
ambiguous, it will interpret; and, if the judiciary does interpret the ADA amendments it
could subsequently establish a comparable interpretation, because it only must apply
broader coverage, and Congress does not explicitly specify just how broad the coverage
should be (Webber, 2014). Therefore, in the subsequent paragraphs, an evaluation will
ensue as a predictor to how current disability cases are now being interpreted in the
judicial system concerning a qualified disability, under the amendments.
Predictor Cases Post-ADA Amendments
On July 23, 2013, the National Council on Disability (NCD) presented a report to
the president of the United States regarding current ADAAA cases that had been brought
forth before the judiciary, a report which furthermore analyzed how a qualified disability
was being interpreted by the judiciary, to date. The National Council on Disability (NCD,
2013), case analysis determined that in the federal circuit courts, six of the seven
decisions did find that a plaintiff had met the burden of proof under the ADAAA
guidelines for establishing a disability (NCD, 2013). Moreover, in the federal district
court decisions plaintiffs also dominantly prevailed vis-à-vis developing a disability "in
more than three out of four decisions" (NCD, 2013, p. 3). However, the NCD further
asserted that despite expanded coverage under the ADAAA for disabled individuals in
the judiciary, the determination of a qualified disability did not necessarily equate to
plaintiffs’ winning their discriminatory cases or discrimination suits (NCD, 2013). The
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NCD clarified that they understood that the ADAAA had only been in effect for a short
time and because of that factor a decisive conclusion could not be rendered if the
ADAAA was being granted congressional intent. (NCD, 2013).
Subsequently, the NCD (2013) also asserted that among ADA cases brought forth
after the amendments were in effect, one third of such cases in the judicial system "did
not apply the ADAAA" (NCD, 2013, p. 9). The NCD, (2013) analyzed the case known
as, Allen v. South Crescent Hosp., (2011) in the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals, in which
the plaintiff was not able to establish a qualified disability under the ADAAA. The
plaintiff in the case filed a claim under the ADA and subsequent amendments "for failure
to accommodate and wrongful termination" (Allen v. South Crescent Hosp., 2011, p. 5).
The plaintiff was suffering from migraines and subsequently hospitalized; however, the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit asserted that the plaintiff "was required, even after
the enactment of the ADAAA and the modified EEOC regulations, to demonstrate that
she was substantially limited in performing a class of jobs or broad range of jobs…
compared to most people" (Allen v. South Crescent Hosp., 2011, p. 18). Thus, the Court
of Appeals determined that the plaintiff was not able to meet the threshold to qualify as
disabled, and rendered summary judgment on behalf of the defendant (Allen v. South
Crescent Hosp., 2011).
The courts further determined that this particular plaintiff failed to establish that
her migraines substantially limited her regarding a "major life activity of care for herself
as compared to the average person in the general population" (29 C.F.R. 1630.2 (j); as
cited in Allen v. South Crescent Hosp., 2011, p. 12). Last, the 10th Circuit further asserted
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and relied upon the case known as Johnson v. Weld Cty., (10th Cir., 2010) in that
"allegation of sleep disturbance that included no basis for comparison with average
person was insufficient to carry plaintiff's burden" (Johnson v. Weld Cty., 10th Cir., 2010,
p. 1218 & n. 10; as cited in Allen v. South Crescent Hosp., 2011). As a result, the NCD
(2013) asserted that this pertinent case could establish a regression about impending
decisions concerning the ADAAA, and should furthermore be diligently observed.
The NCD further announced that, although some progress was being made in the
courts for disabled individuals, many courts were still emphasizing a substantial amount
of "time and energy on the medical and other details and circumstances of an individual's
impairment" (p. 14). The NCD explained that disabled individuals who have alleged
discrimination claims due to their disability have not successfully established a prima
facie case regarding a "legally cognizable disability" (p. 14). Subsequently, the NCD
(2013) reasoned that many disabled individuals have not succeeded with discriminatory
lawsuits due to insufficient legal pleadings prepared by attorneys. Furthermore, education
is significantly needed in this area for attorneys, as well as judges, as to adequately
promote the ADAAA’s primary intent (NCD, 2013).
The NCD also illuminated that congressional intent may still not be adhered to in
the judiciary regarding how particular impairments will fundamentally be interpreted as
to a qualified disability under the ADA. Thus, needing additional analysis, as well as how
impairments that substantially limits an individual regarding major life activities will
fundamentally be interpreted (NCD, 2013). Lastly, the NCD illuminated that additional
analysis in relation to pertinent court decisions "will hopefully be conducted by scholars
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and public agencies in the future, and such comprehensive statistical studies can be
expected to yield invaluable information about the implementation and efficiency of the
ADA and its various significant provisions" (p. 18). Therefore, because there is no
current or perpetual study being performed thus far regarding ADA amendments, and if
they are being adhered to in the judicial system concerning congressional intent, the
significance of this study is ripe for scholarly review.
Summary
The gap in the literature has compelled this author to investigate and understand
how circuit courts are interpreting a qualified disability, per congressional intent (Valenti,
2014; Webber, 2014; & Cavaliere et al., 2012). Moreover, Travis (2012) in suggesting
that understanding how the judiciary is interpreting a qualified disability, either against or
with congressional intent, mandates that it is now time "to render more explicit
[understanding concerning] the full opportunity that the ADA presents for a disability
civil rights agenda" (p. 941). The NCD (2013) strongly emphasized that empirical
evidence by and through political, and academic scholars is necessary and should ensue,
primarily because their research presented to the President of the United States was not
inherently conclusive.
Congress was explicit as to why the amendments were implemented; however, the
primary definition of a qualified disability remains pragmatically the same, only
expanded upon. Nevertheless, despite congressional expansion as to a qualified disability,
the statute in and of itself only expounded that the judiciary should broadly interpret a
qualified disability. However, they did not explicitly define how broad the judiciary
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should fundamentally interpret the new ADA amendments vis-à-vis a qualified disability
(Webber, 2014). Under 42 U.S.C. (b) (5), 2008, the judiciary should not extensively
analyze what a qualified disability is, and once again, the statute is more implicit than
explicit as to how the judiciary should determine how extensive their analysis should be.
Styllinsky (2015) posited that currently the courts had, by that time,
misinterpreted ADA amendments and "if the courts continue to interpret the terms of the
ADA as narrowly as in Ortega, [a recent court case] it will set an example for other
courts to ignore the specifications of this prospective legislation" (para. 10). The Ortega
v. South Colorado Clinic, P. C., (2015) case as referred to throughout this dissertation,
that the court has used pre-ADAAA court holdings, thus applying outdated case
precedent to disqualify the plaintiff from establishing her disability. The Court asserted
that because Ortega filed suit under a state statute, parallel to the ADA, and because the
state statute was not amended, thus pre-ADAAA case law must be used (Ortega v. South
Colorado Clinic, P. C., (U.S. Dist, 2015).
However, the Court in the Ortega, case further relied upon the Smothers v. Solway
Chemicals Inc., (10th Cir., 2014) case to assert that because Ortega, could only proffer
three medical doctor visits to support her sleep disorder, this did not qualify as a
substantial limitation according to the Court, because the Smothers, case was able to
provide 12 instances for medical treatment. The Ortega case not only used pre-ADAAA
court rulings, but the Court also narrowly interpreted definition of a sleep disorder
(Styllinsky, 2015). Many states have statutes that parallel the ADA statute, and many of
the states have not amended their statute to comply with the ADA amendments, hence,
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establishing a Supremacy Clause argument. Therefore, it has become apparent that
continued analysis needs to persist in understanding how the judiciary is interpreting a
qualified disability. Therefore, Chapters 3 will introduce the research and rationale,
methodology, role of the researcher, developed instruments and collection of instruments,
procedures for recruitment, participation and data collection, data analysis plan, issue of
trustworthiness, and ethical procedures; and Chapter 4 will introduce the data results.
Last, Chapter 5 will provide a discussion of the data, conclusion, and recommendation for
further studies.
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Chapter 3: Research Methodology
Introduction
The primary purpose of this study was to understand how the judiciary
collectively interprets qualified disability post-ADA amendments, as well as how the
judiciary is interpreting congressional clarification that the ADA amendments need to be
interpreted broadly regarding a qualified disability. This posited problem by legal
scholars suggested that the amendments do not fundamentally remedy previous or new
ADA challenges (Waterstone, 2015; Webber, 2014; & Valenti, 2014). For example, there
has not been a study, thus far, directly looking at how judicial interpretation post-ADA
amendments in all 12 federal circuit courts collectively are being interpreted under the
new ADAAA. Therefore, the primary purpose was to understand and explore how the
judiciary is interpreting a qualified disability under the new ADAAA.
Research Design and Rationale
The following research questions and subquestions were used in this qualitative
case study:
1. How has congressional expansion and clarification of a qualified disability
impacted judicial interpretation of a qualified disability post-ADA amendments?
2. What are the major changes between judicial decisions regarding a qualified
disability during the first ADA and now the new ADA amendments?
A. What types of disabilities and impairments are or are not being considered
a qualified disability in the judicial system?
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B. What disabilities and impairments have been added as a qualified
disability since ADA amendments?
The research design selected for this study was a qualitative case study. The main
reason and as articulated below why a qualitative approach was utilized versus
quantitative was primarily because “the qualitative approach to research is focused on
understanding a phenomenon from a closer perspective. The quantitative approach tends
to approximate phenomena from a larger number of individuals using survey methods”
(Ben-Eliyahu, 2017, para.1). Thus, this study was focused on understanding how and why
the ADA and now the ADAAA phenomenon occurred by implementing a close
perspective of adjudicated case data during data analysis, and not independently
surveying legal practitioners.
According to O’Sullivan, Rassel, and Berner (2008), a qualitative case study
promotes an appropriate understanding of a phenomenon when ascertaining how and why
a phenomenon occurred. Creswell (2013) stated that "case study approach is familiar to
social scientist due to its popularity in psychology… medicine… law (case law), and
political science (case reports)" (p. 97). Creswell further stated that case studies deal with
"current, real-life cases that are in progress so that they can gather accurate information…
a single case can be selected, or multiple cases identified so they can be compared" (p.
98). Creswell, (2013) further specified, "case study research begins with the identification
of a specific case. This case may be a concrete entity, such as an individual, small group,
an organization, or partnership" (p. 98). Hence, the research design was a qualitative case
study, widely used in political science as well as law, as it deals with real-life situations
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in an organization. Therefore, because the ADA is a law dealing with real-life situations,
and the judiciary is the identified organization, that qualitative case study assisted in
understanding unknown factors concerning judiciary interpretation of ADA amendments,
vis-à-vis a qualified disability.
Other approaches that were not used were narrative, phenomenological, grounded
theory, or ethnographic studies. Narrative studies typically employ "stories from
individuals (and documents, and group conversations) about individuals’ lives and told
experiences" (Creswell, 2013, p. 71). Phenomenological studies dominantly deal with a
"common meaning for several individuals of their lived experiences of a concept or
phenomenon" (Creswell, 2013, p. 76). Whereas, grounded theory seeks to "generate or
discover theory, a ‘unified theoretical explanation’” (Corbin & Strauss, 2007, p. 107; as
cited in Creswell, 2013, p. 83). Lastly, ethnographic studies dominantly immerse a
researcher in “the day-to-day lives of the people and observe and interview the group
participants" (Creswell, 2013, p. 90); thus, this type of research is typically extremely
burdensome and time consuming on a researcher (Creswell). None of the noted
approaches were chosen as a contender because they were deemed not holistic enough for
this study. Creswell (2013) explained that "qualitative case study can be composed to
illustrate a unique case, a case that has unusual interest in and of itself and needs to be
described in detail" (p. 98). To that end, the ADA amendments can be depicted as an
unusual phenomenon, because historically Congress does not characteristically negate
Supreme Court rulings, which in and of itself is unusual. Thus, a qualitative case study
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can elicit why the judiciary misinterpreted congressional intent, and what is the
likelihood of this phenomenon happening again.
Methodology
The methodology selected was qualitative; nevertheless, criterion case sampling
was also used as the sampling procedure. Furthermore, criterion case sampling
implements a case selection that is determined upon a specific measure that will elicit the
best information or a pertinent primary importance (Patton, 2002). Moreover, criterion
sampling is often used for identifying cases that are information rich (Patton, 2002).
Using criterion case sampling allowed a pertinent hierarchy as to how the sample is
collected, thus only utilizing specific cases that would elicit the best primary evidence for
this study. For example, archival data selected will only use ADAAA cases that are
unique about the definition of a qualified disability in the judiciary.
The sampling strategy for its geographical location will be all 12 federal circuit
courts. To reiterate, there are currently no United States Supreme Court cases concerning
the ADA amendments. Patton, (2002) asserted that "it makes strategic sense to pick the
site that would yield the most information and have the greatest impact on the
development of knowledge" (p. 236). Hence, utilizing all 12 federal circuit courts was a
good place to procure ADAAA cases because it allowed for a complete and
comprehensive understanding concerning how the judiciary is interpreting qualified
disability, post-ADA amendments. The NCD (2013) report found 23 cases, both federal
and circuit, and only 7 circuit cases concerning ADA amendments that did not adhere to
the spirit of congressional intent. However, it was asserted in current literature that this
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number has amplified because it has been over three years of elapsed time. Therefore,
criterion sampling was used as the sampling strategy, hence, depicting cases that only
meet pertinent criteria that will offer informative, rich information about the research
study (Patton, 2002).
Role of the Researcher
My role in data gathering was to be the primary data gatherer of all archival data.
I recorded and logged all data personally. Moreover, I did not have any professional
relationships with any of the geographical locations selected for data collection nor did I
hold a supervisory or instructor relationship. No professional, supervisory or instructor
relationship existed between me as the researcher and the selected locations used during
the sought-after archival data.
Researcher bias may exist because I am a protected individual under the ADAAA.
However, procuring introspectiveness was necessary regarding any bias that I may have
about this study. Thus, this was pronounced and understood, so that these biases would
not infiltrate this study. Therefore, dominantly the current bias foreseen as being
problematic was that I did perceive that the ADAAA was currently being misinterpreted,
as well as utilizing other areas in the ADA amendments to misinterpret congressional
intent, despite Congress’ clarified explanation.
Nevertheless, this presumed bias that exists with me, the researcher, was only a
perceived bias, thus, not having any empirical evidence at such time. Understanding that
this bias existed going into the study is paramount, because it allowed me as the
researcher to control the bias, by continually using objectivity in this study. This allowed
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the study not to be skewed in any particular direction. Therefore, being cognizant of this
bias allowed me as the researcher to take all precautions necessary to ensure that all data
was procured and managed in a manner that is protective and conducive to this study,
hence, promoting nonbiased findings that are empirically based in the field of social
science.
Developed Instruments and Collection of Instruments
The developed instrument used for this study was a protocol checklist (See
Appendix A). This protocol checklist assisted when collecting archival data.
Subsequently, a consent form was not deemed necessary because all archival data
relevant to this study is open to the public. Thus, there was no potential risk associated
with this study to possible participants.
In relation to the archival data, the ADAAA adjudicated cases were used as a
primary data source because of its ability, as a legal document, to represent the best
possible data available when understanding how the judiciary is interpreting a qualified
disability.
As depicted above, the selection of archival data, or ADAAA adjudicated cases,
was chosen using criterion sampling in order to ascertain which cases offered the best
available informative information. The collection of archival data was obtained by
understanding its significance in ADAAA jurisprudence, concerning the question as to
how the judiciary is interpreting a qualified disability, and if the data did not meet this
first criteria it was not used for this research.
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Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection
The data collection used archival data, or ADAAA adjudicated cases that directly
spoke regarding the question of how the judiciary interpreted a qualified disability.
Therefore, all data was collected from all 12 federal circuit courts. I collected all data
personally after receiving IRB approval number 03-06-17-0482609. The duration of data
collection was approximately 30 days. The archival data was recorded directly into
software, such as NVivo, that can house large amounts of information. The NCD had a
similar study in 2013, and identified 7 cases in the federal circuit courts for evaluation; it
was confirmed that this number increased since 2013; however, some of the 7 cases used
in the noted report have been used again for further direct evaluation. Last, memberchecking was employed for all gathered archival data to ensure researcher accuracy.
Data Analysis Plan
I used NVivo as the data analysis plan, an all-inclusive computer software
package. NVivo can house all Word documents, transcripts, field notes, PDFs, video, and
audio, in one comprehensive database. I used hand-coding, as well as NVivo software
coding to illuminate a pertinent theme among the archival data. According to Miles,
Huberman, and Saldana (2014), “evaluating coding is appropriate for policy, critical,
action, organizational, and evaluation studies, particularly across multiple cases and
extended periods of time" (p. 76). However, the coding process first began with cycle
coding, typically encompassing a whole paragraph, to single words, subsequently leading
to the second cycle process, which was similar to the first process, but usually
reconfigures codes (Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 2014). Ideally, the first two steps of
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coding help to “retrieve and categorize similar data…so the researcher can quickly
find…segments relating to a particular research question” (Miles, Huberman, & Saldana,
2014, p. 72), thus, illuminating collective data for explanatory meaning (Miles,
Huberman, & Saldana, 2014).
Subcoding was also used to illuminate codes and patterns. Miles, Huberman, and
Saldana (2014) stated that subcoding is typically employed “when general code entry will
later require more extensive indexing, categorizing, and subcategorizing into hierarchies”
(p. 80). The first two cycles of coding were used to illuminate chunks of primary data,
and subcoding was furthermore used to employ a less broad aspect of the first two types
of coding to illustrate a central theme. Once the findings were established, they were not
validated, but verified, primarily because Creswell (2013) explained that procedures such
as "persistent observation, triangulation, peer review, negative case analysis, clarifying
researcher bias, member checks, rich and thick description, or external audits" (pp. 201 –
203) are pertinent steps in order to verify qualitative research findings. Thus, the
procedures above were used in various forms to confirm the results.
Issues of Trustworthiness
Because the study procured information from legal documentation, (i.e., ADAAA
adjudicated cases), no harm to participants existed. Furthermore, archival data acquired is
open to the public and deemed not to be protected data. All files, field notes, digital audio
recordings, and transcripts have been directly stored in a fireproof, waterproof safe with a
lock and passcode, that was only known by me, the researcher.
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Ethical Procedures
Ethical concerns should be initiated during the elementary stages of a research
study and not after. It will be the practice of this study to ensure that all procured data
will be destroyed after seven years of completion of the approved dissertation. Last, and
perhaps most importantly, obtaining permission with the University’s Internal Review
Board was established so that every aspect of this research study has been approved
accordingly. It is also a good rule of thumb to seek out relevant associations that directly
assess ethical issues to promote validity, and I have used this appropriate method
accordingly.
Summary
In summary, the research questions were reiterated, as well as the primary
purpose of the study, which was to understand how the judicial system is interpreting
qualified disability post-ADA amendments. Moreover, a case study was the selected
research design, and qualitative criterion case sampling was the overall methodology.
The role of the researcher was depicted and identified as being observational; nonetheless
the researcher was the general procurer of all archival data. The sample size was
illustrated as a representation of all 12 federal circuit courts, and over 80 posited
adjudicated ADAAA cases in the noted geographical locations. The archival data was
described as ADAAA adjudicated case decisions made between 2009 through 2017.
Trustworthiness of the study and ethical safeguards were also established in the chapter
above by utilizing member-checking to determine validity. Nvivo was used to house all
the research studies, as well as offering coding to develop a related theme, and hand-
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coding was depicted as an additional data analysis used. Chapter 4 will introduce the data
results. Last, Chapter 5 will provide a discussion of the data, conclusion, and
recommendation for further studies.
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Chapter 4: Data Analysis
Introduction
The purpose of this qualitative case study was to understand how each federal
circuit court, collectively, interpreted the post-ADA amendments regarding a qualified
disability, as well as what disabilities and impairments are presently being covered in all
federal circuits post-ADA amendments. This chapter will report on the collected data,
analyze it with verified results, and then introduce the major themes of the study. The
research questions presented throughout this dissertation were identified as:
1. How has congressional expansion and clarification of a qualified disability
impacted judicial interpretation of a qualified disability post-ADA amendments?
2. What are the major changes between judicial decisions regarding a qualified
disability during the first ADA and now the new ADA amendments?
A. What types of disabilities and impairments are or are not being considered
a qualified disability in the judicial system?
B. What disabilities and impairments have been added as a qualified
disability since ADA amendments?
The data collection procedure used to answer the research questions will be given
in the following subsection, Data Collection. No data collection was acquired until
Walden University granted such approval, which occurred on March 6, 2017, by creating
an IRB approval number of 03-06-17-0482609. Walden University validated that the data
collection met all ethical guidelines and University standards.
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Data Collection
The first step in the data collection process was to use LexisNexis to acquire all
ADAAA-adjudicated cases from January 1, 2009 through April 18, 2017. To reiterate,
post-ADA amendments were promulgated into law on January 1, 2009 and this was the
main reason for using the data collection dates. The second step of the data collection
among each of the 12 federal circuit courts was to use Boolean operators with keyword
searches in the LexisNexis legal database search engine to identify and retrieve
adjudicated cases from January 1, 2009 through April 18, 2017. During these searches,
the keyword that received the most hits was, the “Americans with Disability Act
Amended Act (ADAAA)” and “qualified disability,” as well as a “qualified impairment.”
These explicit keyword searches, revealed 83 ADAAA adjudicated cases post-ADA
amendments, in all 12 federal circuit courts.
This dataset was then compared with other legal databases, known as Westlaw,
and Find Law, by looking at each individual federal circuit which assimilated results that
matched those in LexisNexis legal database. To be certain the dataset explicated above
was, in fact, all adjudicated cases during the above-noted dates, an extremely broad
keyword search was input in LexisNexis legal database search engine, as well as the
other noted legal databases. Hence, utilizing only ADAAA as a singular keyword search
established an overly broad search. However, this also replicated the same data results as
using the ADAAA and qualified disability/impairment. Moreover, the dataset was then
member-checked at the Library of Congress in Washington, DC., by visiting the Library
of Congress and obtaining a Library of Congress reader card, card number R 3219111,
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issued on March 28, 2017. I verified the dataset with one of the staff librarians who
specializes in legal research, and the keywords used independently by me were then used
by the staff librarian in Westlaw legal database; the same results were presented as my
previous independent dataset research. Therefore, it was at this time that the dataset
search of ADAAA adjudicated cases from January 1, 2009 through April 18, 2017 was
exhausted, and accepted as the dataset to be used for this qualitative case study
concerning adjudicated post-ADA amendments. The dataset can be verified at:
http://www.lexisnexis.com.ezp.waldenulibrary.org/hottopics/lnacademic/.
However, because the ADAAA did not go into effect until January 1, 2009, and
Congress was not addressing whether post-ADA amendments would be applied
retroactively (Larry Rohr v. Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power
District, 2009), 60 cases identified in the dataset were removed. Pragmatically, this was
because the federal circuit courts deemed those cases had taken place before ADA
amendments took effect, and were thus not granted protection under the ADAAA.
Therefore, 23 adjudicated cases were properly identified as being cases where the
federal circuit courts used the ADAAA when adjudicating over the cases. Below is a
relevant graph among the federal circuit courts displaying the specific number of cases
each circuit court adjudicated over utilizing the ADAAA concerning a qualified disability
and/or an impairment. Hence, these pertinent cases identified among the circuit courts
were used as the primary dataset.
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Figure 1. Federal circuit court cases post-ADA amendments from 1/1/2009 – 4/18/2017.
Furthermore, after the dataset was established, Nvivo coding software, as well as
hand-coding, was applied to illuminate a relevant theme among the dataset that correlated
directly to the research questions. Evaluating coding was employed concerning each case
of the dataset since “evaluating coding is appropriate [for] evaluation studies, particularly
across multiple cases [during an] extended period of time” (Miles et al., 2014, p. 76).
During the coding process, cycle coding was implemented as depicted in Chapter 3,
afterward leading to specific categorized data that was similar in nature vis-à-vis the
qualitative research questions. Subsequently, subcoding was used to elicit pertinent codes
and patterns, also described in Chapter 3. Once the findings illuminated a relevant theme
regarding the research questions, a central theme began to emerge, which allowed the
results to be linked in relation to the research questions. Therefore, the results that
emerged in the dataset are depicted in the subsequent paragraphs by each of the 12
federal circuit courts through directly linking each qualitative research question to each of
the 12 federal circuit courts dataset individually.
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Data Results in the First Circuit
As previously addressed in Figure 1, two circuit cases were found in the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Thus, the two cases identified are as
follows:
1. Jones v. Nationwide Life Insurance Companys, (2012)
2. Mercado v. Puerto Rico, (2016)
RQ1: How has congressional expansion and clarification of a qualified disability
impacted judicial interpretation of a qualified disability post-ADA amendments? The first
case addressed in the First Circuit was Jones v. Nationwide Life Insurance Companys,
(2012). This particular case dealt with the plaintiff/appellant requesting reasonable
accommodations due to a motorcycle accident that left the plaintiff/appellant with
residual chronic pain (Jones v. Nationwide Life Insurance Companys, 2012). Due to this
continuing chronic pain, the plaintiff/appellant was prescribed morphine and opiates for
pain management (Jones v. Nationwide Life Insurance Companys, 2012). Subsequently,
his medical physician cleared the plaintiff/appellant to return to work while continuing
his pain management regimen (Jones v. Nationwide Life Insurance Companys, 2012).
Sometime after the plaintiff/appellant returned to work he was notified by his employer
that his current job required him to pass a series 65 test (Jones v. Nationwide Life
Insurance Companys, 2012).
Despite taking the test three times, and failing during each attempt, the
plaintiff/appellant blamed his inability to pass the test on his prescribed pain management
medication. However, the First Circuit did confirm the ADA amendments involving
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Congressional expansion and clarification in relation to a disability, which needed to be
interpreted broadly, but because his claims occurred before and after the ADA
amendments pre-ADA court rulings were used in the First Circuit’s holdings; ultimately
the lower court’s decision affirmed that the plaintiff/appellant’s claims did not establish
he was a qualified individual under the Act entitling him to reasonable accommodations
(Jones v. Nationwide Life Insurance Companys, 2012). Pragmatically, the first court
reasoned that the plaintiff/appellant was not entitled to reasonable accommodations
because he never notified his employer that his current medication was affecting his
ability to pass the test (Jones v. Nationwide Life Insurance Companys, 2012).
Nevertheless, the First Circuit was extremely cognizant about ADA amendments vis-àvis a disability being interpreted broadly pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A);
conversely, it did not ultimately aid the plaintiff/appellant in winning his case.
In the second case, Mercado v. Puerto Rico, (2016), the plaintiff/appellant
asserted that she was denied public service and discriminated against because she was not
regarded as having a physical or mental impairment. Furthermore, The First Circuit
agreed in their holding that the plaintiff/appellant was regarded as having a physical or
mental impairment by the public service entity under the new ADA amendments pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102, 12132. The court established that the ADA amendments “after the
enactment of the ADAAA… a plaintiff bringing a ‘regarded as’ claim under the ADA
needs to plead and prove only that she was regarded as having a physical or mental
impairment” (Mercado v. Puerto Rico, 2016, p. 589). The plaintiff does not need to
establish in the pleading proof of such impairment that substantially limited one or more
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major life activities (Mercado v. Puerto Rico, 2016; Pub. L. No. 110-325, sec. 4, § 3
(3)(A)).
The First Circuit went on to state that the “ADAAA quite clearly broadened the
definition of being ‘regarded as’ having an impairment beyond what it had been under the
previously controlling Supreme Court interpretation of that phrase” (Mercado v. Puerto
Rico, 2016, p. 589; Pub. L. No. 110-325, sec. 2, § 2(b)(3), sec. 4, § 3(3)(A)). This
elucidation by the court established that the lower court’s ruling was erroneous and
reversed, in favor of the plaintiff/appellant, because she was “regarded as” having a
pertinent physical and/or mental impairment. Therefore, the First Circuit did
acknowledge and establish that Congress mandated the ADAAA to be interpreted
broadly concerning the issue of a physical or mental impairment when asserting a
qualified disability under post-ADA amendments.
RQ2: What are the major changes between judicial decisions regarding a
qualified disability during the first ADA and now the new ADA amendments? In regard
to the major changes between judicial decisions in the First Circuit, during the first ADA,
and now under post-ADA amendments, the First Circuit established precedent. This was
established in Mercado v. Puerto Rico, (2016), wherein the lower court’s incorrect
conclusion that the “ADA’s definition of ‘disability’ were ‘identical’ pre and post
amendment” (p. 589). Pragmatically, the First Circuit’s explanation of congressional
intent concerning the broad coverage Congress intended for the Act speaks volumes to
the lower courts that pre-ADA court holdings should not be used post-ADA amendments.
Therefore, the major changes in both of the cases reviewed above dominantly established
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that judicial decision-making regarding a qualified disability needs to be broadly
interpreted pursuant to the ADA amendments (Jones v. Nationwide Life Insurance
Companys, 2012; Mercado v. Puerto Rico, 2016).
Subquestion A: What types of disabilities and impairments are, or are not, being
considered a qualified disability in the judicial system? Concerning this question, the first
case addressed dominantly dealt with an employer not granting an employee reasonable
accommodations due to a disability. Even though the court in Jones V. Nationwide Life
Insurance Companys, (2012) decided that the plaintiff/appellant did not establish a prima
facie case regarding a disability discriminatory action by an employer, because he was
cleared to go back to work by his primary physician, and never openly acknowledged to
his employer that his impairment and/or disability necessitated reasonable
accommodations. The court further held that after he was cleared to go back to work by
his physician, and even after several failed attempts to take the mandatory series 65 test
and the plaintiff/appellant’s employer offered him another position (Jones v. Nationwide
Life Insurance Companys, 2012). However, the position was for less pay.
The second case evaluated, Mercado v. Puerto Rico, (2016), acknowledged that
the regarded as having a physical or mental impairment need only establish that the
individual was regarded as having a physical or mental impairment, and does not need to
elicit proof in pleadings, (i.e., if an employer or entity deems an individual as having a
physical or mental impairment, such an individual is already perceived as having a
physical or mental impairment).
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Subquestion B: What disabilities and impairments have been added as a qualified
disability since ADA amendments? The First Circuit has not added specifically what
disabilities and impairments are explicitly deemed a qualified disability post-ADA
amendments. Furthermore, both noted cases were not specific disability cases that had
not been addressed before the courts in previous instances. Thus, the only difference is
that the cases in the First Circuit either applied or recognized the ADAAA as being an
Act that was amended with direct clarification as to congressional intent. See Table 1.,
below, entitled Collective Case Results of Research Questions in the First Circuit.

Table 1.
Collective Case Results of Research Questions in the First Circuit
Question

First Circuit

1. How has congressional expansion and

Acknowledged that Congress mandated the

clarification of a qualified disability impacted

ADAAA to be interpreted broadly regarding

judicial interpretation of a qualified disability

the issues of a qualified disability, and

post-ADA amendments?

disallow prior precedent set by the U.S.
Supreme Court that narrowly interpreted a
qualified disability.

2. What are the major changes between

The question of whether a person has a

judicial decisions regarding a qualified

qualified disability has shifted in the First

disability during the first ADA and now the

Circuit cases evaluated to whether an

new ADA amendments?

individual is entitled to reasonable
accommodations or has established the
regarded as prong under the ADA
amendments.
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Table 1.
Collective Case Results of Research Questions in the First Circuit
Question

First Circuit

A. What types of disabilities and impairments

In the First Circuit, the only issues addressed

are or are not being considered a qualified

is whether reasonable accommodations are

disability in the judicial system?

warranted, and regarded as prong rise to the
level of a qualified disability under the
ADAAA.

B. What disabilities and impairments have

None specifically reported.

been added as a qualified disability since
ADA? Amendments?

Data Results in the Second Circuit
The cases found in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
were identified as follows:
1. Mcelwee v. County of Orange, (2012)
2. Rodriguez v. Village Green Realty Inc., (2015)
3. B.C., individually and on behalf of her minor child J.C.; T.H., individually
and on behalf of her minor child T.H., v. Mount Vernon School District, et
al., (2016)
RQ1: How has congressional expansion and clarification of a qualified disability
impacted judicial interpretation of a qualified disability post-ADA amendments. The first
case reviewed in the Second Circuit was, Mcelwee v. County of Orange, (2012). The
Second Circuit addressed the ADA amendments concerning the definition of disability
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“shall be construed broadly ‘to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this
chapter’ and ‘[t]he term ‘substantially limits’ shall be interpreted consistently with the
findings and purposes of the [ADAAA]” (p. 642; 42 U.S.C. §12102 (4) (A) (B)).
Conversely, the plaintiff/appellant in the noted case was deemed to be disabled under the
new amendments, but despite the new amended ADA coverage did not help with the
plaintiff/appellant winning his discrimination suit for reasonable accommodations.
The plaintiff/appellant was sexually harassing other volunteer members in the
program, and the fact that the volunteer program did not accommodate the
plaintiff/appellant with therapy in order to stop or curtail his sexual harassment was
deemed by the court not to be a reasonable accommodation, despite plaintiff/appellant’s
disability. The court reasoned that since the plaintiff/appellant’s abnormal behavior due
to neurodevelopmental disorder was not something that could be easily corrected, thus
reasonable accommodations did not exist for the plaintiff/appellant (Mcelwee v. County
of Orange, 2012). Therefore, neither the ADA amendments nor the broadening definition
of a qualified disability aided this plaintiff/appellant’s case.
The second case analyzed, Rodriguez v. Village Green Realty Inc., (2015), did
recognize that the ADAAA amended the antiquated Supreme Court rulings, which
severely limited how a qualified disability was determined and that “an impairment [that]
substantially limits a major life activity is to be determined with reference to the
ameliorative effects of mitigating measures” (p. 43; 42 U.S.C. § 2 (b) (2), (4)). However,
the court determined that because the plaintiff/appellant brought his discrimination action
under the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., (FHA) and the ADAAA in relation
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to discrimination based on a disability that because the “FHA was not similarly amended
[that]… [] FHA interpretation is still guided by pre-ADAAA cases including Toyota
Motor and Sutton” (Rodriguez v. Village Green Realty Inc., 2015 p. 43). Nevertheless,
the plaintiff/appellant’s discrimination suit was vacated and remanded back to the lower
court, because the Second Circuit held the evidence offered by the plaintiff/appellant did
not qualify him as being disabled under the FHA (Rodriguez v. Village Green Realty Inc.,
2015, p. 43). Therefore, and although the court did recognize the new standing of the
ADA amendments, but because the FHA was not amended to correlate with the ADAAA,
pre-ADA court holdings were used; however, the plaintiff/appellant was still deemed to
be disabled under the ADA.
The last case identified in the Second Circuit was, B.C et al., v. Mount Vernon
School District, et al., (2016). The court in this case did “note that the ADAAA rejected
the Supreme Court’s construction of ‘substantially limits’ [to] be interpreted consistently
with the findings and purposes of the ADAAA” (B.C et al., v. Mount Vernon School
District, et al., 2016, p. 161). However, the disability action of the plaintiff/appellant was
filed under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Subsequently, the
court held that “students with disabilities under the IDEA…. Do[es] not necessarily
constitute a disability under the ADA or section 504” (B.C et al., v. Mount Vernon School
District, et al., 2016, p. 162). Thus, because the IDEA, and the ADAAA, section 504,
defines a disability differently a prima facie case could not be established (B.C et al., v.
Mount Vernon School District, et al., 2016). Consequently, and as noted in the previous
case, Rodriguez v. Village Green Realty Inc., (2012), the Courts, being fully aware of the
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ADA amendments, did not necessarily support the plaintiffs/appellants with their
disability claims. The court did acknowledge in all three cases that Congress’ primary
intent vis-à-vis the ADAAA was to broadly interpret a qualified disability under the Act.
RQ2: What are the major changes between judicial decisions regarding a
qualified disability during the first ADA and now the new ADA amendments? The
Second Circuit changes between the ADA of 1990 and post-ADA amendments in the
three cases noted did acknowledge the court’s understanding of congressional intent
concerning the ADA amendments; however, the ADA amendments were found not to be
applicable in discriminatory suits when filed in conjunction with another Act that had not
been amended to correlate with post-ADA amendments.
Subquestion A: What types of disabilities and impairments are or are not being
considered a qualified disability in the judicial system? The first case mentioned,
Mcelwee v. County of Orange, (2012) stated that the plaintiff/appellant’s disability of
Persuasive Developmental Disorder was deemed a disability, but ultimately did not
establish a discriminatory case based on that disability alone. The second case, Rodriguez
v. Village Green Realty Inc., (2012), a disability of the Autism Spectrum Disorder and
epilepsy were deemed disabilities, but post-ADA amendments could not be used because
they did not correlate with the FHA definition of a disability; however, the court held that
the noted disabilities were recognized disability under the FHA. The last case, B.C et al.,
v. Mount Vernon School District, et al., (2016) dealt with a disability under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), but because the ADAAA, section
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504 defines a disability differently than the IDEA a prima facie case could not be
established.
Subquestion B: What disabilities and impairments have been added as a qualified
disability since ADA amendments? None of the cases established additional disabilities
or impairments; however, they did establish that although the ADAAA was to be
interpreted broadly in the courts, these cases did not fundamentally correlate with a
plaintiff/appellant winning their discrimination case. See Table 2., below, entitled
Collective Case Results of Research Questions in the Second Circuit.

Table 2.
Collective Case Results of Research Questions in the Second Circuit
Question

Second Circuit

1. How has congressional

Acknowledged that Congress mandated the ADAAA to be

expansion and clarification of a

interpreted broadly regarding the issues of a qualified

qualified disability impacted

disability, and disallowed prior precedent set by the U.S.

judicial interpretation of a

Supreme Court that narrowly interpreted a qualified

qualified disability post-ADA

disability.

amendments?
2. What are the major changes

The question of whether a person has a qualified disability

between judicial decisions

has shifted in the Second Circuit cases evaluated as to when

regarding a qualified disability

an individual is entitled to reasonable accommodations.

during the first ADA and now

And, if a case is filed under the ADAAA, and another state

the new ADA amendments?

or federal Act that is not amended with the ADAAA
established a dichotomy as to what definition is applicable.
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Table 2.
Collective Case Results of Research Questions in the Second Circuit
Question

Second Circuit
The Second Circuit used pre-ADA court rulings when
parallel statutes conflicted with the ADAAA.

A. What types of disabilities

In the Second Circuit that Persuasive Developmental

and impairments are or are not

Disorders, Autism Spectrum Disorder and Epilepsy, as well

being considered a qualified

as Educational Disabilities were found as a disability, but

disability in the judicial

ultimately having these types of disabilities did not always

system?

aid the plaintiff/appellant winning their case.

B. What disabilities and

None specifically reported.

impairments have been added
as a qualified disability since
ADA amendments?

Data Results in the Third Circuit
The cases found in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit were
identified as follows:
1. Matthews v, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, et al., (2015)
2. Cunningham v. Novo Nordisk, (2015)
3. Alston v. Park Pleasant, Inc., (2017)
RQ1: How has congressional expansion and clarification of a qualified disability
impacted judicial interpretation of a qualified disability post-ADA amendments? The first
case reviewed in the Third Circuit was Matthews v, Pennsylvania Department of
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Corrections et al., (2015). This case was a disability complaint filed by an inmate
requesting reasonable accommodations due to an impairment hindering his ability to
walk during several months. Congressional clarification and expansion of a qualified
disability in the noted case by the Third Circuit acknowledged that the ADAAA “was
enacted to clarify that the definition of ‘disability’ should be construed ‘in favor of broad
coverage of individuals…to the maximum extent permitted’" (Matthews v, Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections et al., 2015, p. 167; 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (4) (A)). The Third
Circuit further acknowledged that substantially limits as updated by the EEOC in their
“regulations to provide that impairments lasting fewer than six months may be
substantially limiting [thus] covered under the first prong concerning the definition of a
disability” (Matthews v, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections et al., 2015, p. 167; 29
C.F.R. §1630.2 (j) (1) (ix)). Furthermore, because this case concerning an impairment for
a short duration was one of first impressions in the court, the court used the Fourth
Circuit’s holdings of a prior case, Summers v. Altarum Institute, Corporation, (2014),
which addressed a short-term disability claim as being a disability even though it may be
temporary in duration. Thus, the Third Circuit ruled that the plaintiff/appellant did have
an impairment that was recognized under the new ADA amendments.
The second case reviewed in the Third Circuit was, Cunningham v. Novo Nordisk,
(2015). This particular case was an employment discrimination claim where the
plaintiff/appellant suffered a heart attack ensuing in quadruple bypass surgery and
subsequently filed a claim for discrimination and retaliation by her then employer.
However, the Third Circuit in this case did not establish that the plaintiff/appellant was
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disabled under the ADA amendments because the Third Circuit posited that a disability
concerning substantially limiting must still establish that her limitation is substantial, with
the courts citing (42 U.S.C. § 12102 (1) – (2)) as reasoning for their ruling. Furthermore,
the Third Circuit reasoned that because the plaintiff/appellant openly admitted that upon
returning to work she was able to complete her work obligations, and was able to care for
herself in a fully capable manner, this admission was considered by the court to establish
that the plaintiff/appellant was not disabled, since she was not perceived as being
disabled by her employer or colleagues (Cunningham v. Novo Nordisk, 2015).
The last case reviewed in the Third Circuit was, Alston v. Park Pleasant, Inc.,
(2017). This particular case was a discriminatory case in which the plaintiff/appellant
alleged that after being diagnosed with breast cancer she was terminated from her
employment. Nevertheless, the plaintiff/appellant was not deemed by the court to have
established a prima facie case under the ADA amendments because during all stages of
litigation she never asserted that her cancer substantially limited her in regard to major
life activities, such as work, driving, hygiene, or household chores (Alston v. Park
Pleasant, Inc., 2017). Conversely, the court did acknowledge that under the ADA
amendments cancer was a qualified disability in relation to an impairment because it
dealt with the “functioning of one’s immune system [which] is a major life activity"
(Oehmke v. Medtronic, Inc., 2016, p. 756). Therefore, despite the congressional
clarification concerning the ADA that cancer by itself was not deemed to be a disability,
unless the plaintiff/appellant acknowledged it substantially limited her major life
activities.
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RQ2: What are the major changes between judicial decisions regarding a
qualified disability during the first ADA and now the new ADA amendments? A major
change in the Third Circuit concerning the case, Matthews v, Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections et al., (2015) was that it established in their holdings that impairments were
disabilities even if they were for a short duration, which would not have been the
standard under the ADA of 1990. Therefore, this should be seen as an improvement
concerning judicial decision-making relating to short-term disabilities and/or
impairments. The second case reviewed, Cunningham v. Novo Nordisk, (2015) primarily
established a change that although an employee can suffer a heart attack, that inherently
the heart attack does not establish a qualified disability under the ADA amendments if the
plaintiff/appellant openly admits that the heart attack did not diminish or hinder her
ability to perform her tasks; and, because she was not perceived as being disabled by her
employer and colleagues, this was also considered as evidence that the plaintiff/appellant
was not disabled pursuant to the ADAAA. The last case reviewed, Alston v. Park
Pleasant, Inc., (2017), used the same holdings in Cunningham v. Novo Nordisk, (2015),
as direct evidence that the plaintiff/appellant was not disabled pursuant to the ADAAA.
Subquestion A: What types of disabilities and impairments are or are not being
considered a qualified disability in the judicial system? In the Matthews v, Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections et al., (2015), a short-term impairment that affected an
individual’s ability to walk was considered to be an impairment covered under post-ADA
amendments. The second case reviewed Cunningham v. Novo Nordisk, (2015)
established that a heart attack alone does not qualify a disability without the individual
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establishing that the heart attack disabled and/or impaired her ability under the new ADA
amendments. Lastly, Alston v. Park Pleasant, Inc., (2017) established in the Third Circuit
that cancer was not necessarily protected under the ADA amendments if the individual
did not assert that his/her cancer caused any substantial limitation in relation to major life
activities.
Subquestion B: What disabilities and impairments have been added as a qualified
disability since ADA amendments? In the case of Matthews v, Pennsylvania Department
of Corrections et al., (2015), an impairment that was added as a qualified disability under
ADA amendments was that which affected an individual’s ability to walk, even though it
was for a short duration. The second case reviewed, Cunningham v. Novo Nordisk,
(2015) offered no added qualified disabilities under the ADA amendments. The last case
reviewed in the Third Circuit, Alston v. Park Pleasant, Inc., (2017) added no disabilities
and/or impairments under ADA amendments that were not recognized under the ADA of
1990. See Table 3., below, entitled Collective Case Results of Research Questions in the
Third Circuit.
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Table 3.
Collective Case Results of Research Questions in the Third Circuit.
Question

Third Circuit

1. How has congressional

Acknowledged that Congress mandated the ADAAA to be

expansion and clarification of

interpreted broadly regarding the issues of a qualified

a qualified disability impacted

disability, and disallow prior precedent set by the U.S.

judicial interpretation of a

Supreme Court that narrowly interpreted a qualified

qualified disability post-ADA

disability.

amendments?
2. What are the major changes

The major changes between judicial decisions in the Third

between judicial decisions

Circuit between the old ADA and new ADA amendments is

regarding a qualified

that impairments of short duration are considered a qualified

disability during the first

disability.

ADA and now the new ADA?
amendments?
A. What types of disabilities

That a heart attack or breast cancer were not considered to be

and impairments are or are

a qualified disability in the Third Circuit because the

not being considered a

plaintiff/appellants did not assert that their medical issues

qualified disability in the

were substantially limiting concerning major life activities, as

judicial system?

well as not being a perceived disability by the employer or
colleagues. Thus, not a qualified disability under the
ADAAA.

B. What disabilities and

Impaired ability to walk even though it was considered of

impairments have been added

short duration was established an impairment under the

as a qualified disability since

ADAAA.

ADA amendments?
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Data Results in the Fourth Circuit
The cases found in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit were
identified as follows:
1. Summers v. Altarum Institute Corporation, (2014)
2. Jacobs v. N.C. Administrative Office of the Courts, (2015)
3. Gentry v. East West Partners Club Management Company, Inc., (2016)
RQ1: How has congressional expansion and clarification of a qualified disability
impacted judicial interpretation of a qualified disability post-ADA amendments? The first
case reviewed in the Fourth Circuit was Summers v. Altarum Institute Corporation,
(2014). This case was a discriminatory case concerning wrongful termination due to an
alleged disability of the plaintiff/appellant, who in this case had fractured his left leg with
other ensuing injuries pertaining to his left knee and right ankle. The Fourth Circuit
acknowledged that the ADA amendments were to be construed broadly concerning a
qualified disability and that “[t]he ADA makes it unlawful for covered employees to
‘discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability’" (Summers v.
Altarum Institute Corporation, 2014, p. 328). Furthermore, because the plaintiff/appellant
established that his injuries were substantially limiting, thus establishing a disability,
even though his injuries and/or impairment was expected to last less than six months, that
pursuant to 29 C.F.R. 1630.2 (j) (1) (ix) the plaintiff/appellant was protected under the
ADA amendments because the noted code established that “short-term impairments
qualify as disabilities … If they are ‘sufficiently severe’" (Summers v. Altarum Institute
Corporation, 2014, p. 330). Therefore, congressional expansion and clarification did
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allow the plaintiff/appellant the ability to seek safe haven under the ADA amendments
despite his disability being short-term.
The second case reviewed was Jacobs v. N.C. Administrative Office of the Courts
(2015). The plaintiff/appellant suffered from social anxiety disorder, which led her to
request for reasonable accommodations when her employer assigned her to a job that
induced social tasks that exacerbated her social anxiety disorder (Jacobs v. N.C.
Administrative Office of the Courts, 2015). The plaintiff/appellant alleged that her
employer terminated her employment due to her reasonable accommodation request and
subsequently filed suit against her employer for disability discrimination under the ADA,
failure to provide reasonable accommodations, and retaliation under the ADA (Jacobs v.
N.C. Administrative Office of the Courts, 2015). Although this particular case was not
directly filed under the new ADAAA the Fourth Circuit adequately addressed
congressional intent regarding ADA amendments. Pragmatically, the Fourth Circuit
elucidated within their opinion that “[t]he ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA) was
intended to make it ‘easier for people with disabilities to obtain protection under the
ADA’” (Jacobs v. N.C. Administrative Office of the Courts, 2015, p. 572; 29 C.F.R.
§1630.1 (c) (4)). Moreover, the Fourth Circuit also posited that a social anxiety disorder
in regard to directly interacting with others was a major life activity pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§12102 (2) (A); and that the EEOC’s determination within their regulations pursuant to
29 C.F.R. §1630.2 (i) (1) (i) was reasonable to postulate “that interacting with others falls
in the same category… [as] a major life activity” (Jacobs v. N.C. Administrative Office of
the Courts, 2015, p. 573). Therefore, the Fourth Circuit surmised within their opinion that
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a social anxiety disorder in regard to interacting with others is a qualified disability under
the ADA and EEOC’s regulations.
The last case analyzed was Gentry v. East West Partners Club Management
Company, Inc., (2016). The plaintiff/appellant filed a claim for disability discrimination
after the plaintiff/appellant fell at work, subsequently injuring her left foot, as well as her
ankle. This led to her filing for workers’ compensation, and subsequently her being fired
by defendant/appellee. Although the Fourth Circuit did elucidate a pertinent
understanding of the ADA amendments, nevertheless it upheld the jury verdict, because
the jury fundamentally believed that the plaintiff/appellant’s impairment pragmatically
did not establish the definition of substantially limiting concerning a disability.
RQ2: What are the major changes between judicial decisions regarding a
qualified disability during the first ADA and now the new ADA amendments? The major
judicial decision in the first case analyzed is that short-term disabilities, that is, less than
six months, are now considered to be a qualified disability under the ADAAA if the
injury is “sufficiently severe” (Summers v. Altarum Institute Corporation, 2014, p. 330).
Thus, this is a major change between the ADA of 1990 and the ADA amendments
because short term disabilities were not covered under the ADA. The second case
reviewed was Jacobs v. N.C. Administrative Office of the Courts (2015). The major
change between judicial decision-making during the implementation of the first ADA and
now under post-ADA amendments is that in the noted case the Fourth Circuit did find the
plaintiff/appellant disabled under the ADA because her social anxiety disorder interfered
with “interacting with others [and] falls in the same category… [as] a major life activity”
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(Jacobs v. N.C. Administrative Office of the Courts, 2015, p. 573). Last case reviewed in
the Fourth Circuit was, Gentry v. East West Partners Club Management Company, Inc.,
(2016), where the court posited that the plaintiff/appellant’s impairment was not
substantially limiting concerning a major life activity and was not protected under the
ADAAA. Thus, no major changes in judicial decisions in the last case analyzed
Subquestion A: What types of disabilities and impairments are or are not being
considered a qualified disability in the judicial system? In the noted cases, Summers v.
Altarum Institute Corporation, (2014), and Jacobs v. N.C. Administrative Office of the
Courts, (2015) supported that short-term disabilities, and social anxiety disorders are
now being considered a qualified disability in the Fourth Circuit.
Subquestion B: What disabilities and impairments have been added as a qualified
disability since ADA amendments? The Fourth Circuit fundamentally adapted to the
thought that if an impairment and/or disability was "sufficiently severe” pursuant to 29
C.F.R. 1630.2 (j) (1) (ix), then it was indeed a covered disability pursuant to the
ADAAA, even if it was a short-term disability, as well as social anxiety disorders when it
interfered with “interacting with others [which] falls in the same category… [as] a major
life activity” (Jacobs v. N.C. Administrative Office of the Courts, 2015, p. 573). See Table
4., below, entitled Collective Case Results of Research Questions in the Fourth Circuit.

104

Table 4.
Collective Case Results of Research Questions in the Fourth Circuit
Question

Fourth Circuit

1. How has congressional

Acknowledged that Congress mandated the ADAAA to

expansion and clarification of a

be interpreted broadly regarding the issues of a qualified

qualified disability impacted

disability and disallow prior precedent set by the U.S.

judicial interpretation of a qualified

Supreme Court that narrowly interpreted a qualified

disability post-ADA amendments?

disability.

2. What are the major changes

The major changes between the old ADA and new ADA

between judicial decisions

regarding judicial decisions of a qualified disability is

regarding a qualified disability

that the Fourth Circuit determined if a disability and/or

during the first ADA and now the

impairment lasting less than six months was

new ADA amendments?

substantially limiting that it was protected under the
ADAAA; conversely, if it was not substantially limiting
it was not deemed to be protected as a qualified
disability under the ADAAA. However, when
determining substantially limiting it need not be
determined to be significantly or severely restricting, but
sufficiently severe.

A. What types of disabilities and

The Fourth Circuit determined that short term

impairments are or are not being

disabilities not substantially limiting are not covered

considered a qualified disability in

under the ADAAA.

the judicial system?
B. What disabilities and

That short term disabilities in duration that are

impairments have been added as a

considered substantially limiting are protected under the

qualified disability since ADA

ADAAA and social anxiety disorders.

amendments?
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Data Results in the Fifth Circuit
The cases found in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit were
identified as follows:
1. Burton v, Free Scale Semiconductor, Inc., et al., (2015)
2. Ball, et al., v. James M. LeBlanc, Security, Department of Public Safety and
Corrections, et al., (2015)
3. Canon v. Jacobs Field Services North America, Inc., (2016)
RQ1: How has congressional expansion and clarification of a qualified disability
impacted judicial interpretation of a qualified disability post-ADA amendments? The first
case reviewed was Burton v, Free Scale Semiconductor, Inc., et al., (2015). The
plaintiff/appellant filed a wrongful termination lawsuit due to a work-related incident
causing the plaintiff/appellant to allege a disability impairment based on exposure to
fumes that caused heart palpitations. The Fifth Circuit recognized that congressional
expansion concerning the ADA amendments did include a qualified impairment to be a
particular impairment when it distresses the “respiratory and cardiovascular systems”
(Burton v, Free Scale Semiconductor, Inc., et al., 2015, p. 230). The Fifth Circuit
reasoned that the defendant/appellee’s argument that they were unaware of the
plaintiff/appellant’s disability was not factual, and that they were aware of such disability
(Burton v, Free Scale Semiconductor, Inc., et al., 2015).
Moreover, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the ADAAA was quite clear that the
court should overrule prior authority in relation to a plaintiff having to establish “that the
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employer regarded him or her as being substantially limited in a major life activity”
(Burton v, Free Scale Semiconductor, Inc., et al., 2015, p. 230). Therefore, the Fifth
Circuit disagreed with the lower court’s ruling for summary judgment in relation to the
ADAAA claim, and remanded the case back to the lower court for further proceedings
regarding plaintiff/appellant’s ADAAA claim (Burton v. Free Scale Semiconductor, Inc.,
et al., 2015). To that end, the Fifth Circuit armed with the ADAAA congressional
clarification did aid the plaintiff/appellant to survive summary disposition and proceed
further.
The second case viewed in the Fifth Circuit was Ball, et al., v. James M. LeBlanc,
Security, Department of Public Safety and Corrections, et al., (2015). This particular case
arose from multiple inmates on death row who filed a lawsuit alleging that the facility’s
failure to air condition the inmates’ cells violated the ADAAA. The inmates asserted that
the court needed to establish that thermoregulation “is a major bodily function (and thus a
major life activity) because the ADA’s list is not exhaustive” (Ball, et al., v. James M.
LeBlanc, Security, Department of Public Safety and Corrections, et al., 2015, p. 597; 42
U.S.C. §12102 (2) (B)). The Fifth Circuit pointed out that thermoregulation has not been
deemed by any court as a major bodily function, and the EEOC has not establish
regulations concerning thermoregulation as a major bodily function (29 C.F.R. §1630.2
(i) (1) (ii)). Therefore, the Fifth Circuit held that under the ADAAA as expanded and
clarified, thermoregulation is not a disability claim.
The last case viewed in the Fifth Circuit was Canon v. Jacobs Field Services,
North America Inc., (2016). In this particular case, the defendant/appellee, the owner of a
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construction company, offered the plaintiff/appellant a job as a field engineer (Canon v.
Jacobs Field Services, North America Inc., 2016). However, when the defendant/appellee
discovered that the plaintiff/appellant suffered from a rotator impairment, which negated
him from lifting his right arm any higher than his shoulder, defendant/appellee rescinded
their job offer (Canon v. Jacobs Field Services, North America Inc., 2016). Summary
judgment was granted in the lower court, but reversed in the first circuit, because the
Fifth Circuit pointed out that the ADAAA expanded the definition of a disability and that
the lower court had ignored this salient fact (Canon v. Jacobs Field Services, North
America Inc., 2016). Therefore, the Fifth Circuit’s understanding that the ADA
amendments were implemented to clarify and “correct the perceived misconception that
the substantially limits standard to be a more demanding one than Congress had
intended” (Canon v. Jacobs Field Services, North America Inc., 2016, p. 590; 42 U.S.C.
§12101 note).
RQ2: What are the major changes between judicial decisions regarding a
qualified disability during the first ADA and now the new ADA amendments? A major
change between the two different ADA’s in Burton v. Free Scale Semiconductor, Inc., et
al., (2015), Ball, et al., v. James M. LeBlanc, Security, Department of Public Safety and
Corrections, et al., (2015), and Canon v. Jacobs Field Services, North America Inc.,
(2016) was that the Fifth Circuit concluded the ADA amendments concerning a qualified
disability/impairment were to be interpreted broadly.
Subquestion A: What types of disabilities and impairments are or are not being
considered a qualified disability in the judicial system? In the Burton v. Free Scale
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Semiconductor, Inc., et al. (2015) case, the Fifth Circuit concluded the ADA amendments
now included the respiratory system, as well as the cardiovascular system. The second
case, Ball, et al. v. James M. LeBlanc, Security, Department of Public Safety and
Corrections, et al. (2015), concluded that thermoregulation was not considered a
plausible argument to file a discriminatory claim alleging a disability and/or impairment.
The last case reviewed, Canon v. Jacobs Field Services, North America Inc., (2016),
established that a rotator impairment of the right arm did constitute as a disability under
the new expanded and clarified ADA amendments. These amendments negated an
employer’s right to rescind a job offer because of an impairment, since the ADA
amendments established an individual having a disability if “an individual suffers from a
‘disability,’ if that individual has ‘a physical… impairment that substantially limits one or
more major life activities’” (Canon v. Jacobs Field Services, North America Inc., 2016,
p. 590), then such individual has asserted his or her disability (Canon v. Jacobs Field
Services, North America Inc., 2016).
Subquestion B: What disabilities and impairments have been added as a qualified
disability since ADA amendments? Burton v. Free Scale Semiconductor, Inc., et al.
(2015) established that the respiratory system, as well as the cardiovascular system, are
qualifying impairments under the ADAAA. Conversely, Ball, et al., v. James M. LeBlanc,
Security, Department of Public Safety and Corrections, et al., (2015), established no
added qualified disabilities under the new ADA amendments. However, Canon v. Jacobs
Field Services, North America Inc., (2016) did establish that a rotator impairment of an
individual’s arm was to be considered an impairment due to the now more-expanded and
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clarified ADAAA. See Table 5., below, entitled Collective Case Results of Research
Questions in the Fifth Circuit.
Table 5.
Collective Case Results of Research Questions in the Fifth Circuit
Question

Fifth Circuit

1. How has congressional

Acknowledged that Congress mandated the ADAAA to be

expansion and clarification of

interpreted broadly regarding the issues of a qualified

a qualified disability impacted

disability, and disallow prior precedent set by the U.S.

judicial interpretation of a

Supreme Court that narrowly interpreted a qualified

qualified disability post-ADA

disability.

amendments?
2. What are the major changes

The major change between the old ADA and new ADA

between judicial decisions

amendments concerning judicial decisions is that the Fifth

regarding a qualified

Circuit acknowledged that they should overrule prior judicial

disability during the first

precedent as to if an employer regarded he or she as being

ADA and now the new ADA

substantially limited in a major life activity.

amendments?
A. What types of disabilities

The Fifth Circuit did include that the respiratory system and

and impairments are or are

cardiovascular system are impairments when these systems

not being considered a

are distressed. However, thermoregulation was not considered

qualified disability in the

a disability or impairment under the ADAAA. Last, rotator

judicial system?

impairment was also considered in the Fifth Circuit to be an
impairment.

B. What disabilities and
impairments have been added
as a qualified disability since
ADA amendments?

None specifically reported.
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Data Results in the Sixth Circuit
One case found in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was
identified as follows:
1. Horn v. Night Facilities Management – GM, Inc., (2014)
RQ1: How has congressional expansion and clarification of a qualified disability
impacted judicial interpretation of a qualified disability post-ADA amendments? The
only case identified in the Sixth Circuit was Horn v. Night Facilities Management – GM,
Inc., (2014). In this case, the plaintiff/appellant was a janitor who developed sensitivity to
the cleaning supplies used to perform her work duties (Horn v. Night Facilities
Management – GM, Inc., 2014). The plaintiff/appellant asked for reasonable
accommodations, which were “eliminating restrooms on her cleaning route or…
provid[e][] her with a respirator” (Horn v. Night Facilities Management – GM, Inc.,
2014, p. 455).
However, the Sixth Circuit held that her reasonable accommodation request
placed an undue hardship upon the company because the accommodation is not
reasonable, since the plaintiff/appellant’s physician specifically ordered that she have “no
exposure to cleaning solutions” (Horn v. Night Facilities Management – GM, Inc., 2014,
p. 455). The Sixth Circuit further held that they need not establish whether the
plaintiff/appellant is disabled under the ADAAA, because her reasonable accommodation
request placed an undue hardship upon the company (Horn V, Night Facilities
Management – GM, Inc., 2014). Although, in this case the Sixth Circuit did acknowledge
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the ADAAA, but did not go out of its way to explicitly detail the clarification or
expansion of the amendments.
RQ2: What are the major changes between judicial decisions regarding a
qualified disability during the first ADA and now the new ADA amendments? In relation
to the above-noted case, no significant changes in relation to judicial decisions between
the first ADA and now-new ADA amendments.
Subquestion A: What types of disabilities and impairments are or are not being
considered a qualified disability in the judicial system? This case offered no pertinent
answer to this question.
Subquestion B: What disabilities and impairments have been added as a qualified
disability since ADA amendments? This case offered no pertinent answer to this
question. See Table 6., below, entitled Collective Case Results of Research Questions in
the Sixth Circuit.
Table 6.
Collective Case Results of Research Questions in the Sixth Circuit
Question

Sixth Circuit

1. How has congressional

Acknowledged that Congress mandated the ADAAA to be

expansion and clarification of

interpreted broadly regarding the issues of a qualified

a qualified disability impacted

disability, and disallow prior precedent set by the U.S.

judicial interpretation of a

Supreme Court that narrowly interpreted a qualified

qualified disability post-

disability.

ADA? Amendments?
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Table 6.
Collective Case Results of Research Questions in the Sixth Circuit
Question

Sixth Circuit

2. What are the major changes

The Sixth Circuit held that because the plaintiff/appellant’s

between judicial decisions

request for reasonable accommodations placed an undue

regarding a qualified

hardship upon the employer that the plaintiff/appellant’s

disability during the first

request was rightfully not granted by the employer.

ADA and now the new ADA
amendments?
A. What types of disabilities

None specifically reported.

and impairments are or are
not being considered a
qualified disability in the
judicial system?
B. What disabilities and

None specifically reported.

impairments have been added
as a qualified disability since
ADA amendments?

Data Results in the Seventh Circuit
No results found in the Seventh Circuit.
Data Results in the Eighth Circuit
The cases found in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit were
identified as follows:
1. Tramp v. Associated Underwriters, Inc., (2014)
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2. Minnihan v. Mediacom Communications Corporation, (2015)
3. Morriss, III v. BNSF Railway Company, et al., (2016)
RQ1: How has congressional expansion and clarification of a qualified disability
impacted judicial interpretation of a qualified disability post-ADA amendments? The first
case reviewed in the Eighth Circuit was Tramp v. Associated Underwriters, Inc., (2014).
The plaintiff/appellant asserted several claims against her employer; however, her claim
regarding the ADAAA was the only one analyzed. The plaintiff/appellant declared that
her knee pain “limited her ability to perform her daily tasks” (Tramp v. Associated
Underwriters, Inc., 2014, p. 798). The plaintiff/appellant alleges that one day prior to her
scheduled knee surgery her employer decided to terminate her employment (Tramp v.
Associated Underwriters, Inc., 2014). The Eighth Circuit did apply the expansion and
clarification under post-ADA amendments in the noted case.
Nevertheless, because the plaintiff/appellant could not ultimately persuade the
court with the presented evidence on her behalf “to prove the allegation that [her
employer] regarded her as disabled in violation of the ADA” (Tramp v. Associated
Underwriters, Inc., 2014, p. 804), the Eighth Circuit decided it did not have to establish
whether the plaintiff/appellant’s alleged knee pain constituted a disability under the
ADAAA (Tramp v. Associated Underwriters, Inc., 2014). Subsequently, the Eighth
Circuit also reasoned that “[t]hough the ADAAA makes it easier to prove a disability, it
does not absolve a party from proving one” (Neely v. PSEG Tex., P’ship, 5th Cir., 2013, p.
245). Therefore, the Eighth Circuit upheld the lower court’s reasoning that the
plaintiff/appellant was not regarded as having a disability and had no direct proof that
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could be established that her termination was explicitly motivated by the alleged
disability. Thus, the plaintiff/appellant was not able to sustain a claim (Tramp v.
Associated Underwriters, Inc., 2014). Hence, despite congressional clarification and
expansion, did not clearly benefit the plaintiff/appellant’s ability to establish a disability
under the ADAAA since the Eighth Circuit did not find she was regarded as having a
disability either actual or perceived pursuant to 42 USC §12102 (3) (A).
The second case reviewed in the Eighth Circuit was, Minnihan v. Mediacom
Communications Corporation, (2015). In the noted case the plaintiff/appellant suffered
from several seizures, which resulted in driving restrictions for six months. Since the
plaintiff/appellant’s job requirement necessitated him to drive to jobsites as a cable
installer, as well as a supervisor and trainer for other technicians, his employer stated they
could no longer accommodate the plaintiff/appellant. Furthermore, the plaintiff/appellant
filed a discrimination case under the ADAAA. The Eighth Circuit indicated throughout
their opinion that they were aware of the clarified and expansions added to the ADA
amendments.
However, because the plaintiff/appellant’s job required a great deal of driving, the
Eighth Circuit relied upon a former ruling that established potential accommodations
pursuant to the ADA that stated an employer “is not required to relocate the essential
functions of a job…. An accommodation that would cause other employees to work
harder, longer, or be deprived of opportunities is not mandated” (Minnihan v. Mediacom
Communications Corporation, 2015, p. 813) under post-ADA amendments (Minnihan v.
Mediacom Communications Corporation, 2015). Therefore, the Eighth Circuit posited in

115
the case that reasonable accommodations upon this employer would fundamentally
establish an accommodation that would be unreasonable; thus, the plaintiff/appellant
could not establish a prima facie case vis-à-vis disability discrimination, and the
employer, or defendant/appellee, “was entitled to judgment as a matter of law” (Minnihan
v. Mediacom Communications Corporation, 2015, p. 813). Hence, the Eighth Circuit did
acknowledge that the plaintiff/appellant pragmatically was disabled under the ADAAA,
but failed in the above case because the accommodations requested were unreasonable
(Minnihan v. Mediacom Communications Corporation, 2015).
The last case reviewed in the Eighth Circuit was, Morriss, III v. BNSF Railway
Company, et al., (2016). The plaintiff/appellant filed a discriminatory suit against the
defendant/appellee for allegedly discriminating against him because he was clinically
diagnosed with obesity, with a BMI at or over 40% (Morriss, III v. BNSF Railway
Company, et al., 2016). However, the Eighth Circuit did acknowledge congressional
expansion and clarification regarding ADA amendments but determined that obesity was
not a qualified disability under post-ADA amendments. Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit
held that post-ADA amendments do not “define physical impairment, but the EEOC,
[does] exercise[]… statutory authority to issue regulations implement[ed] [to] the ADA”
(42 U.S.C. §12205a; as cited in Morriss, III v. BNSF Railway Company, et al., 2016, p.
1108). However, the Eighth Circuit disagreed with the EEOC’s interpretive guidance
pursuant to 29 C.F.R. §1630.2 (h) (1) that “any psychological disorder or condition,
cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more body systems, such as
neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech
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organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genitourinary, immune, circulatory,
hemic, lymphatic, skin, and endocrine” (Morriss, III v. BNSF Railway Company, et al.,
2016, p. 1108), but does not address obesity, unless a psychological disorder is a
contributing factor (Morriss, III v. BNSF Railway Company, et al., 2016). Thus, the
Eighth Circuit overtly expressed in its holding that obesity is not a qualified disability, in
and of itself, because they looked at the plain language regarding the Code of Federal
Regulations, hence, utilizing textualism for interpretation.
RQ2: What are the major changes between judicial decisions regarding a
qualified disability during the first ADA and now the new ADA amendments? In the
case, Tramp v. Associated underwriters, Inc., (2014), the Eighth Circuit determined that
if the plaintiff/appellant could not establish that they were regarded as having a disability
and/or impairment that a claim under the ADAAA could not be established. In the
second case reviewed in the Eighth Circuit, Minnihan v. Mediacom Communications
Corporation, (2015), the major changes are that although the Eighth Circuit did establish
that the plaintiff/appellant was ostensibly a qualified individual under the ADAAA, but
because his accommodations upon the employer were unreasonable, that the employer
did not discriminate against the plaintiff/appellant, since they were not able to reasonably
accommodate (Minnihan v. Mediacom Communications Corporation, 2015). The last
case reviewed in the Eighth Circuit, Morriss, III v. BNSF Railway Company, et al.,
(2016), established that the court in the Eighth Circuit is looking at the plain language
when interpreting, thus, establishing textualism for the statutory interpretation. This in
and of itself is not a significant change between the ADA of 1990 and post-ADA

117
amendments, but establishes the judiciary’s mindset when interpreting something they
find to be ambiguous, or when trying to quantify whether something is or is not a
disability.
Subquestion A: What types of disabilities and impairments are or are not being
considered a qualified disability in the judicial system? In regard to discriminatory
employer claims that if the plaintiff/appellant does not establish that the employer
regarded him/her as having a disability and/or impairment, the Eighth Circuit reasoned
that such a claim cannot be established in the court (Tramp v. Associated underwriters,
Inc., 2014). The second case reviewed in the Eighth Circuit, Minnihan v. Mediacom
Communications Corporation, (2015), established that epilepsy was indeed a qualified
disability under the new ADA amendments, but failed to establish a discriminatory case
because the plaintiff/appellant’s request for reasonable accommodations was
unreasonable toward the employer. The last case reviewed in the Eighth Circuit, Morriss,
III v. BNSF Railway Company, et al., (2016), established that obesity was not a qualified
disability under the ADA amendments, unless it was a psychological disorder.
Subquestion B: What disabilities and impairments have been added as a qualified
disability since ADA amendments? In Tramp v. Associated underwriters, Inc., (2014), no
disabilities and/or impairments were added to post-ADA amendments. The Eighth Circuit
ruled in Minnihan v. Mediacom Communications Corporation, (2015) that epilepsy was a
qualified disability and/or impairment under post-ADA amendments; however, despite
having a qualified disability and/or impairment under post-ADA amendments, epilepsy
did not equate with the plaintiff/appellant winning his discriminatory case. In Morriss, III
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v. BNSF Railway Company, et al., (2016), no disabilities and/or impairments were added
as a qualified disability under the new ADA amendments. See Table 7., below, entitled
Collective Case Results of Research Questions in the Eighth Circuit.
Table 7.
Collective Case Results of Research Questions in the Eighth Circuit
Question

Eighth Circuit

1. How has congressional
expansion and clarification of
a qualified disability impacted
judicial interpretation of a
qualified disability post-ADA.
Amendments?

Acknowledged that Congress mandated the ADAAA to be
interpreted broadly regarding the issues of a qualified
disability, and disallow prior precedent set by the U.S.
Supreme Court that narrowly interpreted a qualified
disability.

2. What are the major changes
between judicial decisions
regarding a qualified
disability during the first
ADA and now the new ADA
amendments?

The major changes in the Eighth Circuit concerning judicial
decisions under the old ADA and now the new ADA is that a
qualified disability was easier to establish; however,
establishing whether a qualified disability entitled that
individual to reasonable accommodations or if their employer
did not regard the individual as being impaired or disabled
than the Eighth Circuit routinely found that the individual is
not protected under the ADAAA.

A. What types of disabilities
and impairments are or are not
being considered a qualified
disability in the judicial
system?

The Fifth Circuit did include seizures as being a qualified
disability, but the employer was not obligated to reasonably
accommodate; and obesity was found in the Eighth Circuit to
not be a qualified disability.

B. What disabilities and
impairments have been added
as a qualified disability since
ADA amendments?

None specifically reported.
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Data Results in the Ninth Circuit
The case found in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit were
identified as follows:
1. Rohr v. Salt River Agricultural Improvement and Power District, (2009)
RQ1: How has congressional expansion and clarification of a qualified disability
impacted judicial interpretation of a qualified disability post-ADA amendments? The
Ninth Circuit, in the case, Rohr v. Salt River Agricultural Improvement and Power
District, (2009), did not apply the ADA amendments; however, they did overtly express
pertinent knowledge concerning congressional clarification and expansion regarding the
ADAAA. Hence, the residual research questions will not be answered, because this case
offers no empirical evidence to substantiate a qualified answer to expand upon in the
remaining research questions. Conversely, it was important from my perspective to
mention this case since they did acknowledge the ADAAA regarding congressional
clarification and expansion for judiciary reviews. See Table 8., below, entitled Collective
Case Results of Research Questions in the Ninth Circuit.
Table 8.
Collective Case Results of Research Questions in the Ninth Circuit
Question

Ninth Circuit

1. How has congressional expansion

Acknowledged that Congress mandated the

and clarification of a qualified

ADAAA to be interpreted broadly regarding the

disability impacted judicial

issues of a qualified disability, and disallow prior
precedent set by the U.S. Supreme Court that
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Table 8.
Collective Case Results of Research Questions in the Ninth Circuit
Question

Ninth Circuit

interpretation of a qualified disability

narrowly interpreted a qualified disability. However,

post-ADA amendments?

did not specifically apply the ADA amendments in
the above-noted case.

2. What are the major changes between

None specifically reported.

judicial decisions regarding a qualified
disability during the first ADA and now
the new ADA amendments?
A. What types of disabilities and

None specifically reported.

impairments are or are not being
considered a qualified disability in the
judicial system?
B. What disabilities and impairments

None specifically reported.

have been added as a qualified
disability since ADA amendments?

Data Results in the Tenth Circuit
The cases found in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit were
identified as follows:
1. Hawkins v. Schwan’s Home Service Inc., (2015)
2. Adair v. City of Muskogee, Oklahoma, (2016)
3. DeWitt v. Southwestern Bell Telephone, (2017)
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RQ1: How has congressional expansion and clarification of a qualified disability
impacted judicial interpretation of a qualified disability post-ADA amendments? The first
case reviewed in the Tenth Circuit was Hawkins v. Schwan’s Home Service Inc., (2015).
The Tenth Circuit asserted that the lower court was correct in concluding that the
appellant/plaintiff did not present a qualified disability under the ADAAA. Furthermore,
the Tenth Circuit did acknowledge the understanding of the ADAAA and its expanded
and clarifying agenda for the Act, but asserted that the plaintiff/appellant could not
persuade the court that he could perform his work duties with or without reasonable
accommodation (Hawkins v. Schwan’s Home Service Inc., 2015). The
plaintiff/appellant’s specific health conditions were “’heart problems and fainting spells
and very high blood pressure’….minor stroke…. [and] pacemaker implant []” (Hawkins
v. Schwan’s Home Service Inc., 2015, p. 881). The Tenth Circuit further held that when
establishing whether the plaintiff/appellant was a qualified individual with a disability
under the ADAAA that if the plaintiff/appellant could not establish that he could perform
his job functions “with or without reasonable accommodations…. [that] under the statute
‘consideration shall be given to the employer’s judgment as to what functions of the job
are essential’” (42 U.S.C. §12111 (8); Hawkins v. Schwan’s Home Service Inc., 2015, p.
884). Therefore, because the plaintiff/appellant could not secure a DOT-certification for
driving he was not able to perform the functions of the job regardless of the employer
providing reasonable accommodations (Hawkins v. Schwan’s Home Service Inc., 2015).
The second case reviewed in the Tenth Circuit was Adair v. City of Muskogee,
Oklahoma, (2016). This case, as well as the last case reviewed, DeWitt v. Southwestern

122
Bell Telephone, (2017), are both discriminatory claims were the plaintiff/appellants filed
such claims due to the company not reasonably accommodating. In the case, Adair v. City
of Muskogee, Oklahoma, (2016) the plaintiff/appellant had lifting restrictions and the
Tenth Circuit held that because the plaintiff/appellant could not essentially perform his
firefighting duties he was no longer “qualified for the position of firefighter” (p. 1304).
Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit held that because Adair in the above-noted case could not
establish that the requested accommodations were reasonable that the city could not
accommodate (Adair v. City of Muskogee, Oklahoma, 2016).
The last case evaluated in the Tenth Circuit, DeWitt v. Southwestern Bell
Telephone, (2017), also was a case regarding reasonable accommodations due to Type I
diabetes. However, the plaintiff/appellant’s employer asserted that the plaintiff/appellant,
who worked in a call center, was intentionally hanging up on clients or dropping calls and
did not ask for reasonable accommodations because of her diabetes that ostensibly led to
her work deficiencies, but asked for leniency instead (DeWitt v. Southwestern Bell
Telephone., 2017). Therefore, the Tenth Circuit held that because the plaintiff/appellant
did not actually ask for reasonable accommodations but leniency, her reasonable
accommodation claim fundamentally failed (DeWitt v. Southwestern Bell Telephone.,
2017). Despite the noted cases, and their pertinent claims, essentially failing in the Tenth
Circuit, the circuit court did acknowledge the ADAAA was implemented to aid a
qualified disability to be broadly interpreted in the court.
RQ2: What are the major changes between judicial decisions regarding a
qualified disability during the first ADA and now the new ADA amendments? The Tenth
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Circuit major changes concerning judicial decision-making of a qualified disability is that
the court is not focusing on whether an individual has a qualified disability, but whether
an accommodation is reasonable or whether the employer must grant reasonable
accommodations if the claimant cannot perform the job duties with or without reasonable
accommodations.
Subquestion A: What types of disabilities and impairments are or are not being
considered a qualified disability in the judicial system? In the Tenth Circuit the court did
not establish what disabilities and/or impairments are, or are not, a qualified disability,
but rather were faced with whether the requested accommodations were reasonable.
Therefore, because the accommodations were not deemed to be reasonable in the Tenth
Circuit, the Court did not address whether the plaintiff/appellant had a qualified
disability. Primarily, if the employers were not deemed responsible to accommodate, the
plaintiff/appellants’ cases failed.
Subquestion B: What disabilities and impairments have been added as a qualified
disability since ADA amendments? None specifically reported in the Tenth Circuit. See
Table 9., below, entitled Collective Case Results of Research Questions in the Tenth
Circuit.
Table 9.
Collective Case Results of Research Questions in the Tenth Circuit
Question

Tenth Circuit

1. How has congressional expansion

Acknowledged that Congress mandated the

and clarification of a qualified

ADAAA to be interpreted broadly regarding the
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Table 9.
Collective Case Results of Research Questions in the Tenth Circuit
Question

Tenth Circuit

disability impacted judicial

issues of a qualified disability, and disallowed prior

interpretation of a qualified disability

precedent set by the U.S. Supreme Court that

post-ADA amendments?

narrowly interpreted a qualified disability. However,
did not ultimately end with plaintiff/appellant
winning their case.

2. What are the major changes between

The major changes between judicial decisions

judicial decisions regarding a qualified

regarding a qualified disability during the first ADA

disability during the first ADA and

and now under ADA amendments is that the Tenth

now the new ADA amendments?

Circuit was not focusing on whether an individual
has a qualified disability, but whether an
accommodation is reasonable or whether the
employer must grant reasonable accommodations if
the claimant cannot perform the job duties with or
without reasonable accommodations.

A. What types of disabilities and

None specifically reported. However, type I

impairments are or are not being

diabetes, and lifting restrictions were specific

considered a qualified disability in the

disabilities discussed in the Tenth Circuit.

judicial system?
B. What disabilities and impairments
have been added as a qualified
disability since ADA amendments?

None specifically reported.
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Data Results in the Eleventh Circuit
The one case found in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
was identified as follows:
1. Mazzeo v. Colorado Resolutions International, (2014)
RQ1: How has congressional expansion and clarification of a qualified disability
impacted judicial interpretation of a qualified disability post-ADA amendments? The
only case reviewed in the Eleventh Circuit was Mazzeo v. Colorado Resolutions
International, (2014). This case was a wrongful termination suit; the plaintiff/appellant
sued his employer for age discrimination and disability discrimination regarding his disc
herniation problems, which hindered the plaintiff/appellant’s “ability to walk, bend,
sleep, and lift more than ten pounds” (Mazzeo v. Colorado Resolutions International,
2014, p. 1268). The lower court used pre-ADA court holdings, which ultimately
established that the plaintiff/appellant did not prove a qualified disability (Mazzeo v.
Colorado Resolutions International, 2014). However, the Eleventh Circuit pointed out
that Congress intended the ADAAA to not be “overly complex nor difficult, and
expect[ed] that the [ADAAA] will lessen the standard of establishing whether an
individual has a disability for purposes of coverage under the ADA” (Mazzeo v. Colorado
Resolutions International, 2014, p. 1268). Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit asserted that
under the new ADAAA that the plaintiff/appellant did have a qualified disability, hence,
reversing the lower court’s summary judgment and remanding the case back to the lower
court in accordance with their opinion (Mazzeo v. Colorado Resolutions International,
2014).
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RQ2: What are the major changes between judicial decisions regarding a
qualified disability during the first ADA and now the new ADA amendments? The
Eleventh Circuit in the noted case established that the ADAAA explicitly necessitated the
judicial system to consider a qualified disability not to be “overly complex nor difficult”
(Mazzeo v. Colorado Resolutions International, 2014, p. 1268).
Subquestion A: What types of disabilities and impairments are or are not being
considered a qualified disability in the judicial system? The Eleventh Circuit in the noted
case concluded that the plaintiff/appellant’s disc herniation problems were a qualified
disability under the ADA (Mazzeo v. Colorado Resolutions International, 2014).
Subquestion B: What disabilities and impairments have been added as a qualified
disability since ADA amendments? Mazzeo v. Colorado Resolutions International,
(2014) concluded that elements regarding one’s “ability to walk, bend, sleep, and lift
more than ten pounds” (p. 1268) did establish a qualified disability and/or impairment
(Mazzeo v. Colorado Resolutions International, 2014). See Table 10., below, entitled
Collective Case Results of Research Questions in the Eleventh Circuit.
Table 10.
Collective Case Results of Research Questions in the Eleventh Circuit
Question

Eleventh Circuit

1. How has congressional expansion and

Acknowledged that Congress mandated the

clarification of a qualified disability

ADAAA to be interpreted broadly regarding the

impacted judicial interpretation of a

issues of a qualified disability, and disallowed

qualified disability post-ADA

prior precedent set by the United States Supreme

amendments?

Court that narrowly interpreted a qualified
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Table 10.
Collective Case Results of Research Questions in the Eleventh Circuit
Question

Eleventh Circuit
disability. Also, that the ADA amendments,
establishing a qualified disability should not be
complex or difficult when proving.

2. What are the major changes between

Established that the ADAAA explicitly

judicial decisions regarding a qualified

necessitated the judicial system to consider a

disability during the first ADA and now

qualified disability not to be excessively complex

the new ADA amendments?

or difficult.

A. What types of disabilities and

Established that one’s ability to walk, bend, sleep,

impairments are or are not being

and lift more than ten pounds was a qualified

considered a qualified disability in the

disability and/or impairment.

judicial system?
B. What disabilities and impairments

The ability to walk, bend, sleep, and lift more than

have been added as a qualified disability

ten pounds was a qualified disability and/or

since ADA amendments?

impairment.

Data Results in the Twelfth Circuit
No cases found in the United States Court of Appeals for the Twelfth Circuit were
identified.
Summary
In conclusion, the resolution of Chapter 4 was to report a comprehensive analysis
of the qualitative case study and to introduce the results. Moreover, major themes were
presented from the 23 ADAAA adjudicated cases that correlated and answered the
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research questions. The purpose statement was reintroduced, and established that the
dominant research goal was to understand judiciary interpretation in all federal circuit
courts regarding a qualified disability, as well as what impairments and/or disabilities
were being considered under the ADA amendments. A restatement of the research
questions was introduced, as well as a step-by-step report of how the data was gathered
and subsequently organized, ultimately arranging it by looking at each federal circuit
individually. Furthermore, a comprehensive table was entered after each circuit court
analysis to summarize and display the overall illuminated theme(s) in relation to the
research questions.
Therefore, the major theme illuminated throughout all the federal circuit courts
was that they were fundamentally acknowledging the pragmatics of the ADA
amendments. However, this did not necessarily establish that a plaintiff/appellant was
victorious in their appeal. Rather, the courts were looking at other elements in the
ADAAA, such as reasonable accommodations, and the regarded as factor concerning a
qualified disability being overtly acknowledged by an employer, as well as if a
reasonable accommodation placed an undue hardship upon the employer. The federal
circuit courts had a few occurrences where the ADAAA and a parallel state statute or
other federal Acts were filed in tandem with the ADAAA, which caused problems
concerning which definition of a disability was controlling.
Nevertheless, since the definition of a disability did not coincide with the
ADAAA in the cases reviewed by the federal circuit courts, those courts used pre-ADA
rulings in order to establish cohesiveness between the parallel statutes. This was
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dominantly because the state statute, and/or another federal statute addressing the
definition of a disability, was not amended to correlate with the ADA amendments.
Pragmatically, and pursuant to the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. art. VI, stating that if
a state statute conflicts with a federal statute, the federal statute controls. And in the
instance when federal statutes are against one another the doctrine of implied repeal
controls, (i.e., the appeal portion or amended portion of the statute controls). This, in and
of itself, is problematic, because the cases reviewed in the circuits, when challenged with
such, did not utilize the Supremacy Clause or the implied repeal doctrine.
Conversely, the federal circuit courts seem to have no problem expanding the
definition of a qualified disability and/or impairment with congressional intent;
nonetheless, the courts seemed to be more focused on an employer’s ability to reasonably
accommodate, and whether an employee was regarded as having a disability and/or
impairment by the employer. This ultimately was determined in the courts on a case-bycase analysis. Thus, if plaintiff/appellant were unable to prove they were regarded as
having such an impairment or disability, the federal circuit courts typically stated that the
plaintiff/appellant’s lack of proof did not establish a qualified disability under the
ADAAA. To that end, in the cases analyzed, 65% did not win their appeal, whereas, 35%
did. Thus, a more comprehensive discussion will ensue concerning these data results in
Chapter 5, in the summary of findings, conclusions, and recommendations.
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Chapter 5: Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Introduction
In Chapter 5, I will:
•

Discuss and interpret the summary of the findings, collectively among the
circuits.

•

Provide recommendations for further study.

•

List the limitations of the study.

•

Discuss the implications for social change.

•

Examine who will benefit from this study.

•

Interpret the cases cited throughout Chapter 4 in the data analysis as to how
the federal circuit courts are responding to the research questions presented
herein.

To reiterate, Valenti (2014), Webber (2014), Cavaliere et al., (2012), Brennan
(2014), and McKendall et al. (2011) asserted that despite clarifying amendments, the
courts still have numerous ways to misinterpret congressional intent: They can
misinterpret congressional intent by only looking at the plain language of the statute, and
furthermore not looking toward congressional or legislative intent. Pragmatically, ADA
amendments do not explicitly cure past challenges of the ADA (Webber, 2014;
McKendall et al., 2011). Therefore, the research questions presented to establish whether
the ADA amendments were having a pertinent impact as Congress intended were as
follows:
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1. How has congressional expansion and clarification of a qualified disability
impacted judicial interpretation of a qualified disability post-ADA
amendments?
2. What are the major changes between judicial decisions regarding a qualified
disability during the first ADA and now the new ADA amendments?
A. What types of disabilities and impairments are or are not being
considered a qualified disability in the judicial system?
B. What disabilities and impairments have been added as a qualified
disability since ADA amendments?
Summary of Findings
With respect to the research questions, the federal circuit courts explicitly
acknowledged Congress’ primary intent regarding the ADA amendments that a qualified
disability should be interpreted broadly, as well as negating all prior precedent set in the
judicial system that narrowly interpreted a qualified disability. Therefore, this no longer
is at issue in the federal circuit courts that a qualified disability should be interpreted
broadly. The federal circuit courts established that short-term disabilities that are
sufficiently severe, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. 1630.2 (j) (1) (ix), are indeed a covered
disability. Whereas, under the ADA of 1990 short-term disabilities were not. Conversely,
in each circuit, the courts are either not directly ascertaining whether an individual has a
qualified disability, or they are simply just deferring the fact that the individual is
disabled, but directly looking at what the plaintiff/appellant suit is alleging. That is, if the
plaintiff/appellant is bringing forth a discriminatory employment suit for reasonable
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accommodations, wrongful termination, or whether the employer regarded them as
having a disability are now the dominant issues addressed first in the courts. For example,
if a plaintiff/appellant brought forth a suit for reasonable accommodations and the courts
asserted that the individual could not be reasonably accommodated, or posed an undue
hardship upon the employer if they were to be accommodated, the courts asserted that the
plaintiff/appellant did not establish a ADAAA claim before the court.
Moreover, if a plaintiff/appellant did have a disability in the realms of the
ADAAA, but the employer never regarded him or her as having a disability, because the
plaintiff/appellant never declared their disability to their employer, a discriminatory suit
against the employer under the ADAAA failed in the federal circuit courts. Furthermore,
if the employer asserted that a reasonable accommodation placed an undue hardship upon
them, typically the federal circuit courts evaluated what constituted as an undue hardship
on a case-by-case basis. In the Fifth Circuit, when the court evaluated as to whether a
reasonable accommodation placed an undue hardship upon the employer, the court used
the reasoning that if the employer granted this accommodation could the
plaintiff/appellant perform his or her duties? The Fifth Circuit held that the
plaintiff/appellant could not perform these specific duties, and because of this holding the
court asserted the employer did not have to reasonably accommodate if that
accommodation placed an undue hardship upon the employer.
In the federal circuit courts, nine of the cases examined dealt with reasonable
accommodation suits brought forth by a plaintiff/appellant. In the nine cases examined
where a plaintiff/appellant requested reasonable accommodations, only one case, which
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was in the Second Circuit, held that the employer had the duty to reasonably
accommodate. Thus, the federal circuit courts reasoned that the other eight cases brought
forth by a plaintiff/appellant that the employer did not have to reasonably accommodate
for various reasons. The most prevalent reason asserted by the courts was that the
plaintiff/appellant could not perform their duties with or without reasonable
accommodations; hence, the employer was not mandated to accommodate. Therefore, if
the plaintiff/appellant could not establish they could perform their duties with or without
reasonable accommodations subsequently the court did not have to establish whether the
accommodation was reasonable or placed an undue hardship upon the employer.
Moreover, five of the federal circuit court cases examined were due to wrongful
termination alleged by the plaintiff/appellant. Three of the cases were won by the
plaintiff/appellant and the other two cases were lost in the U.S. Court of Appeals. The
three cases that had positive outcomes for the plaintiff/appellant were in the Fourth
Circuit and Fifth Circuit. Both circuits asserted that 29 C.F.R. 1630.2 (j) (1) (ix) stated
that when establishing if an impairment substantially limits a major life activity it should
be done so on a case-by-case basis; but, the term substantially limits shall have an
interpretation that is a lower threshold than was previously applied to the ADA of 1990.
Thus, the circuit courts reasoned that the lower district courts did not implement 29
C.F.R. 1630.2 (j) (1) (ix) when interpreting substantially limits to have a lower threshold.
Conversely, the courts used pre-ADA court rulings which misinterpreted substantially
limiting or substantially limits.
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The other cases analyzed in the dataset dominantly dealt with the regarded as
prong in order to establish a qualified disability and/or impairment under the ADAAA. If
the plaintiff/appellant could not establish that their employer regarded them as having a
disability, because the plaintiff/appellant never made it known to the employer, thus the
employer does not have to reasonably accommodate an employee pursuant to 29 C.F.R. §
1630.2(l)(3). The other few cases in the circuits that directly dealt with individuals
claiming to have a qualified disability under the ADAAA or ADAAA coverage were an
obesity claim and thermoregulation. The courts reasoned that obesity was not a qualified
disability directly on its own unless it was coupled with another qualified disability
and/or impairment. Hence, obesity alone does not establish a qualified disability.
Whereas, the courts asserted that thermoregulation was not covered under the ADAAA
because the ADAAA did not establish in the Act that alleged extreme heat conditions
qualified as a disability and/or impairment under the ADAAA.
Therefore, and as asserted above, each individual federal circuit court did
acknowledge in every instance that the ADAAA was implemented by Congress in order
to correct the courts’ misinterpretation of a qualified disability and/or impairment, to be
interpreted broadly, and to negate prior judicial precedents. Even with this clarified
understanding that Congress extended to the judicial system, still did not inherently
promote a major impact concerning judicial interpretation when correlating with the first
research question in regard to establishing a qualified disability under the ADA
amendments. This was dominantly because the courts either did not directly address
whether the individual had a qualified disability or simply established that even if they
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did have a qualified disability their claim would fail under the ADAAA for the various
reasons asserted above. The second research question was to understand the major
changes between judicial decisions during the ADA of 1990 and now under the new
ADA amendments which established that the federal circuit courts are not fixated
whether an individual has a qualified disability and/or impairment, but whether their
allegations regarding not being reasonably accommodated, or wrongfully terminated, as
well as the regarded as prong establishes a prima facie case under the ADAAA.
Another interesting illumination when evaluating the cases in the dataset is that if
a state statute was asserted in a plaintiff/appellant’s claim, and if the state statue was not
amended to correlate with the federal statute or ADAAA, then the federal circuit courts
used pre-ADA court holdings even though they were determining a case directly under
the ADAAA. Last, the two subquestions did not fundamentally establish what disabilities
and/or impairments are now being covered under the ADAAA, because as noted, the
courts are not dominantly fixating on this pertinent question concerning if a
plaintiff/appellant has established a prima facie case under the ADAAA in relation to
other elements of the ADAAA. Conversely, the two instances where the federal circuit
courts did address whether the plaintiff/appellant asserted a qualified disability and/or
impairment, were in the cases of obesity and thermoregulation, which were not deemed a
qualified disability and/or impairment under the ADAAA.
Conclusion of Data Results Collectively among the Circuits
When the ADA of 1990 was implemented and multiple years after the fact, over
90% of all cases were dismissed by the courts when a plaintiff brought forth a
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discriminatory suit under the ADA of 1990 (Valenti, 2014). However, the courts
dominantly narrowed the definition of a qualified disability and/or impairment, which
directly caused a plaintiff to inherently lose his or her suit because they were either not
disabled enough or too disabled to qualify under the ADA. Furthermore, what this study
discovered is that the circuit courts collectively have heard Congress’ intent for the ADA
amendments, and have acknowledged that a qualified disability and/or impairment should
be interpreted broadly, as well as to negate prior legal precedents established under the
ADA of 1990. The federal circuit courts have established that short-term disabilities that
are sufficiently severe pursuant to 29 C.F.R. 1630.2 (j) (1) (ix) are indeed a covered
disability pursuant to the new ADA amendments, whereas, under the ADA of 1990,
short-term disabilities were not. Conversely, this collective understanding in the federal
circuit courts still does not dominantly establish that a plaintiff/appellant will win an
alleged discriminatory case in the courts. In fact, of the 23 cases analyzed in the dataset,
only 35% of the cases won their appeal, whereas, 65% of the cases analyzed in the
dataset ultimately lost their appeal. Nevertheless, 35% of the cases winning at the circuit
court level is producing a better outcome than the cases brought under the ADA of 1990,
which was less than 20% in the circuit courts, and less than 10% in the district courts
(Valenti, 2014).
Therefore, the most noteworthy illumination of this pertinent study is that the
cases brought before the federal circuit courts concerning reasonable accommodations,
wrongful terminations, and whether an employer regarded the employee as having a
disability under the regarded as prong, are dominantly being lost in the federal circuit
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courts. Thus, when the courts are faced with parallel statutes they are utilizing pre-ADA
court rulings, because the statutes have not been amended to correlate with the ADAAA.
Hence, this is a specific area that should be monitored, because the standard that the
courts are utilizing in order to determine, for example, reasonable accommodations may
be too strict of a guideline than was initially intended by Congress.
Recommendations for Further Study
The recommendation for further study that should ensue is why reasonable
accommodations are characteristically being lost in the federal circuit courts.
Furthermore, nearly all the cases reviewed were employment discriminatory cases, and
the clear majority of the cases reviewed dealt with the issue of reasonable
accommodations. However, even when the court evaluated whether an accommodation
was reasonable, they first determined whether the plaintiff/appellant could perform his or
her job duties with or without reasonable accommodations. If a plaintiff/appellant was
not able to prove that they could perform his/her job duties with or without reasonable
accommodations, the court simply stated that the plaintiff/appellant did not establish a
prima facie case before the courts under the ADAAA.
For example, in the cases examined, there were multiple instances where a
plaintiff/appellant was on a restrictive work duty, such as lifting limitations, and because
of the restricted work duty the plaintiff/appellant was now unable to perform their duties
with or without reasonable accommodations; therefore, they were not entitled to ADAAA
protection. Hence, reasonable accommodations pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 do not
include removing job functions that are primarily important, or changing a pertinent part
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of the job function that is primarily important. Therefore, the federal circuit courts
reasoned in many of the cases that if an individual has medical restrictions that would not
allow the individual to perform his or her work tasks, then the employer does not have to
change the job requirements, if those requirements are essentially important to the job.
Pragmatically, if an employer cannot reasonably accommodate an employee, then
an employer has an onus to reassign the employee to another position. However, an
employer does not have to reassign an employee if it would place an undue hardship on
the employer, or reassigning the employee is not applicable because he or she is
unqualified for an equal or lesser position (29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(o)). The reassignment
clause is seldom used to reasonably accommodate because there are multiple ways for an
employer to simply suggest it would place an undue hardship, or that the employee is not
qualified for said position. Hence, a study should be performed, perhaps in the federal
district courts, regarding how the courts are interpreting what is a reasonable
accommodation, and correlate that interpretation with congressional intent. That is, how
did Congress expect reasonable accommodations to be interpreted in the court?
Nevertheless, the federal circuit court cases examined herein are not directly answering
the question of what is reasonable concerning accommodations, but rather, if an
employee can perform his or her job duties with or without reasonable accommodations;
and if they cannot, then the employer does not have to reasonably accommodate, because
there are no accommodations to be made.
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Implications for Social Change
The implications for social change this study has promoted is that in the federal
circuit courts, such courts are acknowledging congressional clarification concerning
ADA amendments, as well as negating prior precedent established under the ADA of
1990 in the courts. However, and as previously asserted, Congress’ clarification
regarding ADA amendments, and how a qualified disability should be interpreted is
inherently not fundamentally promoting plaintiffs’/appellants’ cases to be won. This
study contributed this phenomenon to be happening in the federal circuit courts, because
the courts are not interpreting what are the elements of a qualified disability and/or
impairment, but are rather looking at other factors, such as reasonable accommodations,
and the regarded as prong when determining whether a plaintiff/appellant has established
a prima facie case before the courts. Subsequently, if the courts have determined that a
prima facie case cannot be established in regard to reasonable accommodations, or other
factors depicted throughout this study, the courts do not have to answer the question
concerning whether a plaintiff/appellant has a qualified disability and/or impairment.
Therefore, this study will aid governmental entities, such as the EEOC, Congress, legal
professionals, and the disability community regarding how the federal circuit courts are
interpreting ADA amendments, and the specific challenges, such as what is a reasonable
accommodation, that are being faced in the courts when bringing forth ADAAA claims.
Limitation of Study
The dominant limitation of this study concerning the findings is that no federal
district circuit courts were examined regarding the research questions. Conversely, the
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primary focus was directly looking at the federal circuit courts collectively, and not the
federal district courts. Furthermore, because over 800 cases were identified in the federal
district courts, the dataset would have been too vast of a research endeavor for this study.
Therefore, because only 23 cases were identified in the federal circuit courts collectively,
it is not currently known how the federal district courts would have contributed to the
study. Nevertheless, and understanding that federal district court cases are appealed by a
proper litigant to the U.S. Court of Appeals, or the applicable federal circuit court, that
this was dominantly a good place to start to understand how the ADA amendments are
proceeding in the federal circuit courts.
Summary
The dominant aspect of the new ADAAA that this study revealed is that the
federal circuit courts collectively have acknowledged that a qualified disability should be
interpreted broadly, and to negate prior legal precedents established under the ADA of
1990. However, what was an interesting illumination of this study is that the federal
circuit courts are not fixating as to whether a plaintiff/appellant has a qualified disability
and/or impairment, but asserting and utilizing other methods to establish whether a
plaintiff/appellant has established a prima facie case before the courts under the ADAAA.
It was determined in this study that 65% of all ADAAA cases heard in the federal circuit
courts did not ultimately win their appeal. Conversely, 35% of the cases did promote
positive results in the federal circuit courts. Therefore, although only 35% of the cases
heard at the federal circuit courts are establishing positive results for a plaintiff/litigant,
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this is a much higher level of results than under the ADA of 1990, which only established
10% of plaintiffs’/appellants’ winning their cases at the federal circuit level.
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Appendix A: Data Protocol Checklist
Data Protocol Checklist (internal).
Date: __________________________________

Location: _______________________________

Potential Archival Data Name: ___________________________________________

1. How many years has the potential archival data been primary precedent law?
Answer: _____________________________________________________________
2. How will the archival data assist with answering the research questions?
Answer: _____________________________________________________________
3. What type of archival data is being used, (i.e., statute, legal case, floor speech, etc.)?
Answer: _____________________________________________________________
4. Is the archival data primary or secondary precedent, and how will it benefit this
research study?
Answer: ______________________________________________________________

Archival data Qualifications:
Yes____ the archival data has met the requirements necessary for this research study.
No____ the participant has not met the necessary requirements for this research study.

